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ABSTRACT
THE VALUATION EFFECTS OF CORPORATE INVESTMENT DECISIONS: 
EVIDENCE FROM DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN PLANT ANNOUNCEMENTS.
Bum Suk Kim 
Old Dominion University, 1996 
Director: Dr. John Doukas
This study examines the effects of corporate investment decisions - announcements 
of plants - on the value of the firm, using event-study methodology. This paper consists 
of two parts. Essay I discusses the valuation effects of domestic investments, while Essay 
II analyses the valuation effects of foreign investments undertaken by U.S. firms and 
compares the valuation effects between the two investments. Specifically, this study 
examines the validity of the overinvestment hypothesis and whether focus-increasing 
investments enhance the value of the firm.
First, the evidence shows that the valuation effects of the investment decision depend 
on the firm’s investment opportunities, proxied by Tobin’s q. That is, the domestic and 
foreign plant announcements of value-maximizing firms (i.e., q > 1) earn significant 
positive abnormal returns, while those of overinvesting firms (i.e., q < 1) realize 
significant negative abnormal returns. Also, for value-maximizing firms, the abnormal 
returns are positively but insignificantly related to the level of cash flows, while, for 
overinvesting firms, the abnormal returns are negatively related to the level of cash flows. 
These results suggest that managers of overinvesting firms are more likely to waste cash
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
flows in sub-optimal or negative net present value projects than managers of value- 
maximizing firms. The evidence is consistent with the predictions of the overinvestment 
hypothesis [Jensen (1986), Lang and Liztenberger (1989), Doukas (1995)].
Second, for both domestic and foreign investments, focus-increasing investments are 
found to gain positive abnormal returns, whereas diversifying domestic and foreign 
investments experience significant negative abnormal returns. Further, post-investment 
performance tests show that firms with focus-increasing investments tend to improve their 
profitability, while firms with diversifying investments do not. This evidence appear to 
support the view [Lang and Stulz (1994)] that increases in corporate focus are consistent 
with shareholder wealth maximization.
Overall, the results suggest that the valuation effects of corporate investment decisions 
depend on the firm’s investment opportunities and the type of investment decisions 
pursued by the managers.
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The Valuation Effects of Corporate Investment Decisions: 
Evidence From Domestic Plant Announcements
Essay I
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ABSTRACT
This study examines the stock market reaction to announcements of corporate 
investment decisions by U.S. firms, using a sample of 194 domestic plant announcements 
during the period of 1980-1992. The results show that value-maximizing firms gain 
significant positive abnormal returns, while overinvesting firms experience significant 
negative abnormal returns. Also, for overinvesting firms, there are significant agency costs 
associated with managers’ discretion of free cash flows. The evidence supports 
overinvestment hypothesis. This paper also finds that diversifying investments decrease 
the value of the firm, while focus-increasing investments do not, implying that an increase 
in corporate focus is consistent with shareholder wealth maximization.
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1I. Introduction
Corporate managers are involved in acquisitions, R&D, and capital budgeting 
investment decisions. Several researchers have studied the effects of acquisitions and 
R&D expenditures on the market value of the firm.1 Even though firms have long 
invested in plants, the effects of plant investment decisions on shareholder wealth have 
received little attention relative to other investment decisions (i.e., acquisitions and R&D).
Shareholder wealth maximization hypothesis suggests that managers seek to maximize 
shareholder wealth in corporate investment decisions. Thus, investment decision rule 
states that managers should undertake only positive net present value (NPV) projects. In 
contrast, Jensen’s (1986) overinvestment hypothesis suggests that, even though firms have 
poor investment opportunities, managers with free cash flows2 tend to undertake sub- 
optimal or negative NPV projects instead of distributing them to shareholders, resulting 
in overinvestment and a reduction in firm value. This is because managers may feel that 
their compensation, power, and job security are enhanced as firm size increases. However, 
firms with profitable investment opportunities are more likely to use their internally 
generated funds productively. Hence, the overinvestment hypothesis implies that the
1 See Travlos (1987), Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter (1988) for evidence 
on acquisitions, Chan, Martin, and Kensinger (1990), Doukas and Switzer (1992) for evidence on 
valuation effects o f R&D expenditures, and McConnell and Muscarella (1985) for evidence on capital 
budgeting decisions.
2 Jensen (1986) defines free cash flows as discretionary cash flows available to managers in excess of 
that required to fund all positive projects.
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valuation effects of corporate investment decisions may depend on firm’s investment 
opportunities. In addition, Jensen (1986) argues that corporate diversifying strategy (i.e., 
acquisition programs) is one way in which managers waste free cash flows, implying that 
diversifying investments are likely to be value-decreasing activities.
McConnell and Muscarella (1985) find that announcements of unexpected increase 
in company-wide capital expenditures are associated with positive market returns,3 while 
announcements of unexpected decrease are associated with negative market returns. Their 
findings are consistent with the market value maximization hypothesis. However, the 
positive stock price reactions may stem from the fact that a sample of capital expenditure 
increases is associated with either firms with good investment opportunities or focus- 
increasing investments. On the other hand, the negative stock price reactions may be 
caused by the fact that a sample of capital expenditure decreases is associated with either 
firms with poor investment opportunities or diversifying investments. However, 
McConnell and Muscarella (1985) do not account for the effects of firm’s investment 
opportunities and type of investment on the value of the firm. Moreover, since their 
sample consists of company-wide capital expenditures, it is difficult to draw parallel 
conclusions on the valuation effects of specific investment decisions such as plants.
Corporate investment decisions associated with acquisitions report that bidder returns 
are often negative [Roll (1986), Dodd (1980), Malatesta (1983)].4 This evidence shows 
that corporate investment decisions are not consistently associated with shareholder wealth
3 McConnell and Muscarella (1985) exclude specific investment announcements (i.e., plant).
4 See Jensen and Ruback (1983) for review of the literature on domestic acquisitions.
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maximization. Morck, Shliefer, and Vishny (1989) attribute the losses from acquisitions 
to divergence of interests between managers and shareholders with respect to corporate 
investment decisions. Servaes (1991) and Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991) examine 
whether firm’s investment opportunities, measured by Tobin’s q, are important 
determinants of gains from acquisitions. Servaes (1991) find that benefits of mergers are 
larger when bidders are well-managed (i.e., q > 1). Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991) 
document that bidders with high free cash flows and poor investment opportunities (i.e., 
q < 1) suffer significant negative returns for tender offers. This evidence appears to be 
consistent with prediction of Jensen’s (1986) overinvestment hypothesis.
Several papers [Statman and Sepe (1989), Blackwell, Marr, and Spivey (1990), 
Gombola and Tsetsekos (1992)] have examined the valuation effects of discontinuation 
of investments and documented mixed market reactions. Statman and Sepe (1989) find 
that, under the assumption of investors’ knowledge of losses from projects, capital 
markets respond positively to such announcements. On the other hand, Blackwell, Marr, 
and Spivey (1990), Gombola and Tsetsekos (1992) argue that negative abnormal returns 
associated with plant closing announcements are caused by negative information about 
firm’s investment opportunities.
Previous evidence on valuation effects of acquisitions [Jensen and Ruback (1983)] 
and plant closings [Statman and Sepe (1989), Blackwell, Marr and Spivey (1990), 
Gombola and Tsetsekos (1992)] have provided mixed results. A possible explanation is 
that the valuation effects of corporate investments depend on (1) firm’s investment 
opportunities and (2) type of investment (i.e., focus-increasing and diversifying).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
However, these two factors have not been considered in the previous studies.
This paper attempts to provide new evidence on the valuation effects of corporate 
investment decisions, using a sample of domestic plant announcements during the period 
of 1980-1992. Specifically, two issues are addressed: (1) free cash flow/overinvestment 
hypothesis and (2) type of investment (i.e., focus-increasing and diversifying).
First, this paper examines whether the valuation effects of corporate investment 
decisions depend on firm’s investment opportunities.5 The sample is classified into firms 
with profitable investment opportunities (i.e., value-maximizing) and firms with poor 
investment opportunities (i.e., overinvesting). The overinvestment hypothesis predicts that, 
for overinvesting firms, managers are likely to waste cash flows by undertaking negative 
NPV projects, resulting in overinvestment and, hence, a reduction in the value of the firm. 
Thus, plant investment announcements by overinvesting firms are expected to produce 
negative abnormal returns. On the other hand, for value-maximizing firms, managers are 
likely to spend cash flows on positive NPV projects, resulting in an increase of 
shareholder wealth. Thus, plant investment announcements are not expected to cause 
uniform valuation effects across firms.
The overinvestment hypothesis also implies that agency costs associated with the 
discretion of free cash flows are expected to be greater for firms with poor investment 
opportunities. Since investments by value-maximizing firms are expected to be positive 
NPV projects, the stock price reactions are not likely to be related to free cash flows. 
That is, agency costs associated with the discretion of free cash flows are expected to be
5 Lang and Litzenberger (1989) derive overinvestment hypothesis from free cash flow hypothesis to test 
the valuation effects of dividend changes.
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5insignificant. However, since investments by overinvesting firms are expected to be 
negative NPV projects, the stock market returns are likely to be negatively related to free 
cash flows. This study provides cross-sectional evidence on relation between the firm’s 
level of free cash flows and its stock price returns.
Second, this paper examines whether there are any differences in stock market returns 
between focus-increasing and diversifying investments. Since the 1980s, empirical results 
have been unfavorable to corporate diversification. Wemerfelt and Montgomery (1988) 
document that firm performance, proxied by Tobin’s q, is positively related to an increase 
in corporate focus. Morck, Shliefer, and Vishny (1990) show that unrelated acquisitions 
in the 1980s did elicit negative effects on stock prices, while related acquisitions did not. 
Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) report that unrelated acquisitions are more likely to be 
value-decreasing activities than related acquisitions since the divestitures rate is higher for 
unrelated acquisitions than related acquisitions. Lang and Stulz (1994) report that Tobin’q, 
proxy for firm value, and the degree of business diversification are negatively related 
through the late 1970s and 1980s.6 John and Ofek (1995) find that an improvement in 
corporate performance is associated with divestitures that increase firm’s business focus.7 
Their study reports a positive relation between increase in corporate focus and change in 
profitability of firms around investment announcements.
6 Lang and Stulz (1994) use Tobin’s q as the measure of performance instead of the measurement 
problem of accounting performance measures since the use of Tobin’s q does not require a risk 
adjustment or normalization to compare Tobin’s q across firms, in contrast to comparison of stock 
return or accounting performance measures.
7 John, Lang, and Netter (1992) report that one of the reasons for firm’s negative earnings is 
overinvestment. In their study, increasing focus is common strategy of firms coping with performance 
declines.
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6Even though evidence on the valuation effects of corporate diversification are 
provided in the context of corporate acquisitions or divestitures, there is little evidence 
on the impact of focus-increasing and diversifying plant investments on the value of the 
firm. To examine whether focus-increasing investments are more highly valued than 
diversifying investments, the sample is divided into focus-increasing and diversifying 
corporate investments. If diversifying investments are one way in which managers waste 
cash flows for their own benefit at the expense of shareholders [Jensen (1986)], or if an 
increase in corporate focus enhances managerial efficiency [John and Ofek (1995)], it is 
expected that focus-increasing (diversifying) investments realize positive (negative) stock 
returns. Further, whether the extent of abnormal returns associated with the type of 
investment depends on firm’s investment opportunities is analyzed. This study also 
compares pre- and post-performance between focus-increasing and diversifying 
investments. Finally, the relation between changes in performance and changes in 
corporate focus is reported.
In general, the results are consistent with the predictions of the overinvestment 
hypothesis. Value-maximizing firms gain significant positive stock market returns for 
plant investments, while overinvesting firms experience significant negative abnormal 
returns. Also, the stock market returns are negatively related to the free cash flows of 
overinvesting firms and unrelated to the free cash flows of value-maximizing firms. The 
evidence also shows that focus-increasing investments earn positive abnormal returns, 
while diversifying investments suffer significant negative abnormal returns, implying that 
increase in corporate focus is associated with market value maximization [Lang and Stulz
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
(1994), John and Ofek (1995)]. Firms with focus-increasing investments improve their 
performance after investments, whereas firms with diversifying investments do not. Also, 
the changes in performance are positively related to increase in corporate focus. Overall 
evidence shows that firm’s investment opportunities and the type of investment are 
important determinants of corporate investment gains.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews the previous literature on 
capital expenditures decisions and the relation between the market value of the firm and 
corporate diversification. The two main issues - overinvestment hypothesis and valuation 
effects of type of investment - are discussed in section IE. Section IV describes data and 
methodology. In section V, empirical evidence is presented. Section VI has concluding 
remarks.
II. Literature Review
A. The Domestic Capital Investment Decision
Empirical research into corporate investment decisions has been based on the 
assumption that managers undertake only positive net present value (NPV) projects to 
maximize shareholder wealth [McConnell and Muscarella (1985)]. Accordingly, all 
corporate investments are expected to increase the market value of the firm. However, 
empirical evidence is not consistent with market value maximization hypothesis [Dodd 
(1980), Malatesta (1983), Jensen and Ruback (1983)].
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Jensen (1986) argues that managers with substantial free cash flows have a tendency 
to overinvest by undertaking negative NPV projects. It implies that there are agency costs 
between managers and shareholders with respect to the use of free cash flows. That is, 
managers may spend cash flows for their own benefit at the expense of shareholders. 
According to the overinvestment hypothesis, firms with poor investment opportunities 
(i.e., overinvesting firms) are likely to waste cash flows by undertaking negative NPV 
projects. On the other hand, firms with profitable investment opportunities (i.e., value- 
maximizing firms) are likely to spend cash flows on positive NPV projects. Thus, the 
valuation effects of corporate investment decisions may depend on firm’s investment 
opportunities. The overinvestment hypothesis predicts that investment increases by value- 
maximizing (overinvesting) firms would enhance (reduce) the value of the firm.
In contrast to Jensen (1986), McConnell and Muscarella (1985) assume no agency 
costs concerning corporate capital expenditure decisions. In a sample of 658 capital 
expenditure announcements during the period of 1975-1981, they find that announcements 
of unexpected increases (decreases) in planned capital expenditure are associated with 
significant positive (negative) abnormal stock returns.8 However, the positive (negative) 
stock market returns may be driven by the fact that in their sample value-maximizing 
firms were overrepresented. McConnell and Muscarella (1985) do not account for the 
valuation effects of firm’s investment opportunities. In addition, since their sample 
consists of only company-wide capital expenditure announcements, their study does not 
provide evidence on specific investment decisions such as plants. Thus, it is difficult to
8 The exception is that, for a sample of exploration and development, an increase in budgets exhibits 
negative stock returns, while a decrease in budgets realizes negative stock returns.
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9draw parallel conclusions for the valuation effects of plant investments.
Empirical evidence on acquisitions shows that bidding firms, on average, do not gain 
positive abnormal returns [Dodd (1980), Malatesta (1983), Jensen and Ruback (1983)]. 
Meanwhile, using firm’s investment opportunities measured by Tobin’s q, Servaes (1991) 
and Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991) present evidence on valuation effects of 
acquisitions. Servaes (1991) reports, in a sample of 704 mergers and tender offers over 
the period of 1972-1987, that well-managed firms (i.e., q > 1) have larger gains than 
poorly-managed firms (i.e., q < 1). Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991) examine a sample 
of 101 tender offers over the 1980-1986 period. The their results show that acquiring 
firms with low q (i.e., q < 1) and high free cash flows gain the lowest abnormal returns, 
while those with high q (i.e., q > 1) and low free cash flows experience the largest 
abnormal returns. This evidence seems to support the overinvestment hypothesis.
The valuation effects of discontinuation of investments have provided mixed results. 
In a sample of 111 project termination announcements over the 1969-1983 period, 
Statman and Sepe (1989) find positive stock market reactions to project termination 
announcements. Given investor’s knowledge of losses, firm’s willingness to reduce value- 
decreasing activities is associated with positive impacts on the value of the firm. On the 
other hand, Blackwell, Marr, and Spivey (1990) and Gombola and Tsetsekos (1992) find 
negative stock returns to the announcements of plant closing decisions.9 The authors 
suggest that, under information asymmetry of profitability of plants between managers and
9 Blackwell, Marr, and Spivey (1990) use a sample of 286 plant closing announcements from 1980 
through 1984. In Gombola and Tsetsekos (1992), a sample o f 283 plant closing announcements during 
the period of 1980-1986 is examined.
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10
investors, negative abnormal returns may be caused by negative information about firm’s 
investment opportunities.
Previous empirical tests of corporate investments [Jensen and Ruback (1983), Statman 
and Sepe (1989), Blackwell, Marr, and Spivey (1990)] have yielded inconclusive results. 
In the previous studies, firm’s investment opportunities have not been considered as a 
determinant of the valuation effects of corporate investment decisions. This study 
examines whether the firm's investment opportunities are associated with the valuation 
effects of corporate investment decisions.
B. Types of Investment Decisions
The valuation effects associated with the type of investment (i.e.. focus-increasing and 
diversifying) have been only examined in the context of divestitures and acquisitions.
Porter (1987) reports that, in a sample of thirty-three U.S. companies during the 
period of 1950-1986, acquisitions have an average divestment rate of 60%.10 However, 
since firms may divest for reasons other than performance declines, divestiture rates may 
not be interpretec- as unambiguous measures of failure [Weston (1989)].“
Wemerfelt and Montgomery (1988) find that firm performance, proxied by Tobin’s
10 Porter (1986) tracks acquisitions made over 1950-1986. The success ratio o f diversification as the 
number of units retained after the acquisition by the firm is measured.
11 Warding-off takeover, changing strategies, and government requirements are suggested as motives 
for divestiture activities [Weston (1989)].
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q, is positively related to an increase in corporate focus.12 They interpret this evidence 
as less focused firms are less efficient to transfer their competitive edges to different 
markets than more focused firms. However, since their study is based on only one-year 
period (i.e., 1976), it may be difficult to draw general conclusions.
Studies about acquisitions have produced evidence in favor of focus-increasing 
investments. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) find that, in a sample o f 326 U.S. 
acquisitions between 1975 and 1987, bidders realize positive abnormal returns for related 
acquisitions, whereas bidders experience negative abnormal returns for unrelated 
acquisitions. In a sample of 282 acquisitions over 1971-1982, Kaplan and Weisbach 
(1992) document that about 60% of diversifying acquisitions are divested. In contrast, 
fewer than 20% of related acquisitions are divested. The authors interpret this evidence 
in support of the view that corporate diversification is a value-decreasing investment.
Lang and Stulz (1994) find a negative relation between Tobin’s q, proxy for firm 
performance, and the degree of diversification.13 In their study, Tobin’s q is negatively 
correlated with the number of business segments and positively correlated with the mean 
and median of Herfindahl index. The evidence also shows that mean and median Tobin’s 
q of diversifying firms are lower for focus-increasing firms, implying that capital markets 
value focus-increasing firms more highly than diversifying firms. However, their
12 Wemerfelt and Montgomery (1988), in their model, regress Tobin’s q on focus, industry, and market 
share variables. They do not report estimates o f regression coefficients but contribution of these 
variables to the adjusted R2 o f a regression.
13 Lang and Stulz (1994) discuss the problem o f comparing the average returns o f  diversified firms with 
that o f specialized firms. They use chop-shop approach [Lebaron and Speidell (1987)] in which the 
q ’s o f diversified firms is the q these firms would have if stand-alone q of each segment were the 
average q o f the single-segment firm in its industry.
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classification scheme is different from that used in this study.14
Using a sample of 321 divestitures by U.S. firms during the period of 1986-1988, 
John and Ofek (1995) test whether an increase in corporate focus is consistent with 
shareholder wealth maximization.15 Using several accounting measures of performance, 
their study documents that firms that increase focus by divestitures improve their 
performance after divestitures, while firms that increase diversification do not.16 They 
argue that it may occur because sales of assets unrelated to core-business increase the 
efficient use of corporate resources. In addition, cross-sectional analysis shows a 
significant positive relationship between increases in corporate focus17 and a corporate 
post-divestiture performance.
Using several focus measures,18 Comment and Jarrell (1995) show a trend toward 
increase in corporate focus across exchange-listed firms during the period of 1978-1989. 
In their study, changes in number of business segments and Herfindahl index over the 
sample period are estimated as a measure of change in degree of diversification. In 
addition, they document that focus-increasing firms have larger abnormal returns than
14 In Lang and Stulz (1994), firms that change the number o f  business segments from one to two or 
more in the sample period of 1978-1990 are classified as diversifying firms and firms that reduce 
segments from five or more to four or less are classified as focus-increasing firms.
15 They restrict their sample only to the divestiture o f operating units, excluding the partial divestitures 
or sell-offs o f non-operating assets such as real estate.
16 Three measures o f profitability are (1) earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation (EBITD) to 
sales, (2) EBITD to book value o f assets, and (3) EBITD to market value of equity.
17 Dummy variable equals zero if the divested segment’s main 4-digit SIC code is the same as the 
seller’s main 4-digit SIC code, and one otherwise.
18 Comment and Jarrell (1995) calculate focus measures such as the number of four-digit SIC codes 
assigned by COMPUSTAT and a revenue-based Herfindahl index.
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diversifying firms.19 Instead of using an event study, authors estimate the cumulative 
abnormal returns over the year of the changes in focus and the preceding year. However, 
this approach could not identify the market reactions to investment announcements.
Using business segment-based data, Berger and Ofek (1995) develop the industrial 
multiplier approach and compare the sum of the imputed stand-alone values of the 
segments of diversified firms to the actual values of those firms.20 Values of diversified 
firms are estimated to be 13% to 15% below the sum of the imputed values of their 
segments, implying that corporate diversification decreases the firm value. The focus in 
Berger and Ofek (1995) is on the relation between the level of degree of diversification 
and firm value, whereas focus in this study is on the effects of the changes in the degree 
of diversification on the value of the firm.
Previous studies on the effects of corporate diversification, generally, support the view 
that diversification hurts shareholder wealth. However, there is no evidence, to our 
knowledge, that examines directly the valuation effects of focus-increasing and 
diversifying investment decisions.
19 Comment and Jarrell (1995) classify a sample of firms according to the direction of the change in 
focus as measured by the revenue-based Herfindahl index - 1) focus increase, 2) no change, and 3) 
focus decrease.
20 Berger and Ofek (1995) use the industrial multiplier approach in which they measure the percentage 
difference between a firm 's total value and the sum of imputed values for its segments as stand-alone 
entities. They compare the sum of the imputed stand-alone values of the segments o f diversified 
companies to the actual values of those companies. The natural log o f the ratio o f firm’s actual value 
to its imputed value is a measure of the gain or loss in value from diversification. Positive excess 
returns indicate that diversification increases the value of segments beyond that of their stand-alone 
counterparts. Negative excess returns indicate that diversification reduces value.
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A. Overinvestment Hypothesis
A traditional investment decision rule states that managers should undertake only 
positive NPV projects. That is, if the discounted value of expected cash flows from plant 
investment is positive, the decision to undertake such an investment would increase the 
value of the firm. Thus, announcements of an increase (decrease) in investments are 
expected to have positive (negative) stock market returns [McConnell and Muscarella 
(1985)].
Agency costs between managers and shareholders are discussed by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). Unless managers are constrained by monitoring or bonding, they would 
make corporate decisions that increase their own utility. Jensen (1986) argues that there 
are agency costs associated with the distribution of free cash flows. That is, managers 
with high free cash flows have a tendency to overinvest by undertaking negative NPV 
projects instead of distributing free cash flows to shareholders.21 Jensen’s (1986) 
overinvestment hypothesis predicts that firms with poor investment opportunities are more 
likely to waste cash flows by engaging in sub-optimal or negative NPV projects, resulting 
in overinvestment and a reduction of the value of the firm. On the other hand, firms with 
profitable investment opportunities are more likely to use cash flows in positive NPV
21 Evidence in favor o f free cash flows/overinvestment hypothesis is presented by Pilotte (1992) for 
security offering announcement, Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991) for tender offers, and Lehn and 
Poulsen (1989) for going private transactions.
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projects, leading to shareholder wealth maximization. Thus, the overinvestment hypothesis 
implies that the valuation effects of corporate investment decisions depend on firm’s 
investment opportunities.
This paper tests the overinvestment hypothesis by analyzing the impact of corporate 
investment decisions on the value of the firm. Testing the overinvestment hypothesis 
requires knowledge of firm’s investment opportunities. This paper uses Tobin’s q to 
distinguish value-maximizing (i.e., q > 1) from overinvesting (i.e., q < 1) firms.22 
According to the overinvestment hypothesis, investment announcements by value- 
maximizing firms are expected to generate positive market returns, while investment 
announcements by overinvesting firms are expected to produce negative market returns.
The overinvestment hypothesis also implies that the free cash flow available to 
managements is an important determinant to explain the abnormal returns for investments. 
That is, since overinvesting firms are expected to waste free cash flows in sub-optimal 
or negative NPV projects, free cash flows might increase agency costs between managers 
and shareholders, implying a negative relation between the level of cash flows and 
abnormal market returns. On the other hand, since value-maximizing firms are likely to 
spend free cash flows on value-increasing investments, no relation between the level of 
free cash flows and abnormal market returns is expected. To examine this implication, 
this study analyzes the cross-sectional relation between stock market returns and free cash 
flows for value-maximizing and overinvesting firms, respectively.
To further examine the extent of abnormal returns associated with free cash flows and
52 See Lang and Litzenberger (1989) for the use o f Tobin’s q as an indicator of overinvestment.
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firm’s investment opportunities, the sample is divided into four subsamples according to 
firm’s investment opportunities and level of free cash flows: (1) value-maximizing firms 
with high free cash flows, (2) value-maximizing firms with low free cash flows, (3) 
overinvesting firms with high free cash flows, and (4) overinvesting firms with low free 
cash flows. According to the overinvestment hypothesis, investment announcements by 
overinvesting firms with high free cash flows are expected to yield the lowest abnormal 
returns since these firms are more likely to have the highest agency costs and undertake 
negative NPV projects. Value-maximizing firms are expected to earn positive abnormal 
returns regardless of the level of free cash flows since these firms are expected to use 
cash flows in positive NPV investments.
B. Type of Investment Decisions
This section examines whether the type of investment (i.e., focus-increasing and 
diversifying) has any differential effects on the value of the firm. The potential benefits 
associated with corporate diversification include: (1) greater operating efficiency,23 (2) 
less incentive to pass up positive NPV projects,24 and (3) greater debt capacity and lower 
taxes.25 The potential costs include: (1) the use of increased discretionary resources to
23 Chandler (1977) argues that, diversified firms are more efficient and profitable than their line of 
business would be separately since diversified firms have better coordination than focused firms.
24 Weston (1989) states that diversified firms have large internal capital markets so that they make more 
positive NPV investments than focused firms.
25 Lewellen (1971), Majd and Myers (1987) argue that diversified firms are predicted to have more tax 
advantage than focused firms since diversified firms have greater debt capacity.
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undertake value-decreasing investments, (2) information asymmetry costs between central 
and divisional managers,26 (3) cross-subsidies that allow poor segments to drain 
resources from better performing segments, and (4) misalignments of incentives between 
core business and non-core business.27 However, the overall valuation effects of 
corporate diversification are not clear.
Some studies about corporate diversification through acquisitions have explained the 
valuation effects in the context of agency problems [Jensen (1986), Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1988), Shleifer and Vishny (1989)]. Agency theory of acquisitions states that 
diversification is undertaken for reasons other than market value maximization. Managers’ 
incentives to invest in unrelated business to the firm’s core business may be motivated 
by managers’ objectives to reduce employment risk.28 Jensen (1986) argues that 
managers with free cash flows are more likely to undertake value-decreasing investments 
(i.e., diversification programs29) instead of paying them out to shareholders. Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) suggest that managers tend to overinvest beyond the value- 
maximizing level and pursue value-decreasing diversifying investments for their own 
benefits at the expense of shareholders. Shleifer and Vishny (1989), Morck, Shleifer, and
26 Harris, Kriebel, and Raviv (1982) suggest that information asymmetry costs are higher in diversified 
firms than in focused firms, resulting in a reduction of value o f the firm than their lines o f business 
would be separately.
27 Myer, Milgrom, and Roberts (1992) argue that unprofitable lines o f business create greater value 
losses in conglomerates than they would as stand-alone firms.
28 Amihud and Lev (1981) argue that managers have incentive to reduce their employment risk.
29 The increase in oil price generated large cash flows in the oil industry in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. However, oil industry managers did not pay out the free cash flow to shareholders. Instead, 
they launched diversification programs to invest funds outside the industry (e.g. Montgomery Ward 
by Mobil Corp., Reliance Electric by Exxon). These acquisitions turned out to be unsuccessful.
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Morck (1990) argue that managers can entrench themselves by making manager-specific 
investments, implying that corporate diversification activities are not consistent with 
shareholder wealth maximization. That is, managers may attempt to diversify due to 
firm’s poor financial performance relative to other firms in the same industry. Such 
diversified investments may make it costly for shareholders to replace existing 
management.
The issue of diversification effects has been also studied by examining the relation 
between change in degree of diversification and the change in firm value, using a sample 
of divestitures of non-core-business assets. The rationale of divestitures is that firms could 
be better managed and achieve greater profits if firms concentrate on their core­
businesses. In the 1960s and 1970s, there were trends toward diversification into unrelated 
business. However, since 1980s, this trend has been reversed [Comment and Jarrell 
(1995)]. This phenomenon is interpreted as evidence supporting the view that 
diversification is not consistent with shareholder wealth maximization [Berger and Ofek 
(1995), Comment and Jarrell (1995)]. John and Ofek (1995) find that sales of assets 
unrelated to the core-business lead to an improvement in the operating performance of the 
seller’s remaining assets due to an increase in operational efficiency. Stock returns for 
asset-sale announcements are also greater for focus-increasing divestitures than focus- 
decreasing divestitures, supporting the view that firms could increase shareholder wealth 
by focusing on its primary business.
Lang and Stulz (1994) find a negative relation between Tobin’s q and the degree of 
diversification, suggesting that the capital markets value focus-increasing firms more than
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diversifying firms. It may be because focus-increasing firms might have a competitive 
advantage in core-business activities, while diversifying firms might not have such an 
advantage.
The previous studies about divestitures [Porter (1987), Comment and Jarrell (1995), 
John and Ofek (1995)] and acquisitions [Morck, Shliefer, and Vishny (1989)] provide 
evidence against diversification. Porter (1987), Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) use 
divestitures rates as an evidence of the failure of diversifying investments. However, 
divestiture ratios may be subject to measurement problems [Weston (1989)]. In Comment 
and Jarrell (1995) and Berger and Ofek (1995) study, changes in either the number of 
segments or Herfindahl index are estimated to measure the degree of corporate 
diversification, instead of comparing the SIC digit code of new investment with that of 
firm’s primary business. Lang and Stulz (1994) and Wemerfelt and Montgomery (1988) 
examine the cross-sectional relation between the degree of diveisification and firm value. 
Furthermore, divestitures announcements may realize positive market reactions since the 
capital markets interpret that firms correct previous bad investment decisions. However, 
it is unclear whether diversifying investments become value-decreasing even though the 
investments have once been profitable30 or whether managers undertake diversifying 
investments for the reasons other than shareholder wealth maximization even though they 
are value-decreasing. Given these previous studies, it is difficult to draw parallel 
conclusions concerning the valuation effects of specific corporate investments.
30 Weston (1989) argues that firms may sell a business it has improved or a business that once had 
synergies with the firm’s core business but no longer does. In this case, original investments could 
have been increased shareholder value.
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This paper provides direct evidence on the valuation effects of focus-increasing and 
diversifying investments, using a sample of plant investment announcements. The sample 
is classified into focus-increasing and diversifying investments. If diversifying investment 
is one way in which managers waste cash flows for their own benefit at the expense of 
shareholders [Jensen (1986), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989)], or if an increase in 
corporate focus enhances managerial efficiency, it is expected that focus-increasing 
investments gain positive stock returns, while diversifying investments exhibit negative 
abnormal returns.
To further examine whether the extent of the abnormal returns associated with type 
of investment may differ significantly for value-maximizing and overinvesting firms, the 
sample is classified into four subsamples according to firm’s managerial characteristics 
and type of investment: (1) value-maximizing firms with focus-increasing investments, 
(2) value-maximizing firms with diversifying investments, (3) overinvesting firms with 
focus-increasing investments, and (4) overinvesting firms with diversifying investments. 
Focus-increasing investment announcements by value-maximizing firms are expected to 
gain the largest abnormal returns, since these investments are likely to be more value- 
increasing activities. On the other hand, diversifying investment announcements by 
overinvesting firms are expected to experience the lowest abnormal returns, since these 
investments are likely to be more value-decreasing activities.
Furthermore, Lang and Stulz (1994) argue that firms which have limited investment 
opportunities in their core-business are likely to engage in diversifying investment 
transactions. However, such firms may lack the required competitive edge in non-core
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business and thus lose from diversification. Consistent with Lang and Stulz (1994), John 
and Ofek (1995) report that focus-increasing asset-sales are associated with an 
improvement in firm performance, while diversifying asset-sales are not.
IV. D ata & Methodology
A. Data
The sample of this essay I consists of domestic plant announcements during the 
period of 1980-1992.31 The sample is collected from the annual edition of the Wall 
Street Journal Index. Once the announcement dates are identified, other relevant 
information is obtained from the articles reported in the Wall Street Journal.
The sample is collected based on the following criteria: (1) firms should be U.S. 
manufacturing companies, (2) firms should be listed on NYSE or AMEX, and (3) CRSP 
and COMPUSTAT tapes are available for the firms. Firms announcing purchase of 
equipment or machinery, capital budgeting, and purchase of plant from other companies 
are excluded. Also excluded are firms with other corporate announcements around 15 
days of plant announcement. This screening procedure produces a sample of 194
31 For example,
Eastman Kodak plans to build a $50 million plant in suburban Gates, N.Y. to manufacture 
Ektaprint copier-duplicator and parts (WSJ Jan. 07, 1981).
Union Camp will build a $600 million bleached pulp and paper mill near Eastover, S.C.
(WSJ May 20, 1981).
Armco will build a $50 million steel-coating facility at its Middleton, Ohio (WSJ Oct. 03, 1984).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 2
investment announcements.
The sample is divided into value-maximizing and overinvesting firms, using Tobin’s 
q. If a firm has q > 1 (sample size = 61), it is classified as value-maximizing. Otherwise, 
firms with q < 1 are classified as overinvesting (sample size = 133). The sample is also 
classified into high and low free cash flow firms. Lehn and Poulsen (1989) define free 
cash flows as operating income before depreciation minus interest expense, taxes, 
preferred dividends, and common dividends. In this study, the value of normalized free 
cash flows is used as in Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991). Lang and Litzenberger (1991) 
normalize free cash flows by dividing them by the book value of the total assets since 
large firms are more likely to have higher cash flows. If free cash flows of a firm are 
larger (smaller) than the sample median, it is classified as high (low) free cash flow firm.
The sample is also divided into firms with focus-increasing investments (sample size 
= 129) and firms with diversifying investments (sample size = 59). An investment is 
classified as a focus-increasing investment if the 2-digit SIC code of the investment is the 
same as the firm’s main 2-digit code (i.e., firm’s core-business). Otherwise, it is classified 
as a diversifying investment.32
The frequency distribution of the sample of domestic investment announcements by 
year during the period of 1980-1992 is presented in Table 1-1. The 194 announcements 
are made by 152 different U.S. firms.
32 The Herfindahl index, defined as the sum o f segments’sales squared divided by total sales squared, 
has been used as alternative measure to classify investments into focus-increasing and diversifying 
investment.
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Table 1-2 shows the frequency distribution of domestic investment announcements, 
classified by the 2-digit SIC industrial code.
[ Insert Table 1-2 about here]
Most domestic investment announcements occurred in the following industries: paper 
and allied products, chemical and allied products; primary metals; industrial machinery 
and equipment; motor vehicles and car bodies or transportation equipments. However, 
domestic investment activity represents a relatively broad spectrum of industries.
Table 1-3 reports summary statistics of the sample of firms with domestic 
investments,33 including Tobin’s q, free cash flow, ratio of debt to total assets, ratio of 
R&D to sales, ratio of advertising expenditure to sales, insider ownership (i.e., proportion 
of outstanding shares held by insiders), ratio of foreign sales to total sales, size of 
investment, and firm size. Panel A shows the summary statistics for the entire sample. 
Panel B provides the summary statistics for the sample of the value-maximizing firms 
(i.e., q > 1) and panel C reports the summary statistics for overinvesting firms (i.e., q < 
1).
33 The data for estimation of Tobin’s q and firm size are collected from Compustat. Insider ownership, 
ratio of foreign sales to total sales are obtained from Value Line Investment Survey. Sizes of 
investment are obtained from the article reported in the Wall Street Journal.
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Table 1-1
Frequency Distribution of the Domestic Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms: 
1980-1992
Year Frequency
1980 30
1981 23
1982 22
1983 14
1984 19
1985 10
1986 5
1987 12
1988 12
1989 12
1990 10
1991 9
1992 16
Total 194
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Table  1-2
Frequency Distribution of the Domestic Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms, Classified 
by Industry (2-digit SIC code): 1980-1992
2-digit
SIC Code Industry Group Frequency
13 Oil and gas exploration 1
20 Food and kindred products 10
22 Textile mill products 1
23 Apparel and other finished goods 2
24 Lumber and wood products 5
26 Paper and allied products 19
27 Printing and publishing 1
28 Chemicals and allied products 50
29 Petroleum refining 11
30 Rubber and plastic products 9
32 Stone, clay, and glass products 7
33 Primary metals 21
34 Fabricated metal products 3
35 Indust machinery & computer equip. 16
36 Electronic equipment 4
37 Transportation equipment 22
38 Measuring instr., photography, watches 9
48 Communication 1
59 Miscellaneous retail 1
78 Motion pictures 1
194
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It is evident that value-maximizing firms have a higher mean ratio of R&D to sales 
than overinvesting firms, suggesting that value-maximizing firms have more growth 
opportunities than overinvesting firms. Value-maximizing firms, on average, have a lower 
proportion of shares held by insiders than overinvesting firms, implying that value- 
maximizing firms are widely owned than overinvesting firms. Value-maximizing firms 
appear to have a higher mean ratio of foreign sales to total sales than overinvesting firms. 
The average size of the plant investment is larger for overinvesting firms ($152 million) 
than for value-maximizing firms ($88 million). In terms of market capitalization, value- 
maximizing firms are, on average, larger than overinvesting firms.
B. Methodology
a. Estimation of Tobin’s q
Tobin’s q, defined as the ratio of the market value of the firm to the replacement cost 
of its assets, has been used to explain cross-sectional differences in investment 
opportunities and management performance across firms.34 For example, Tobin’s q is 
used as measure of management performance [Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989),
34 For example, the relationship between managerial equity ownership and firm value [Morck, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990)], the relationship between managerial performance 
and tender offer gains [Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989)].
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Table 1-3
Summary Statistics For Firms with the Domestic Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms: 
1980-1992
N Mean Std. dev Minimum Maximum
Panel A: Entire sample
Tobin’s q 194 0.8562 0.5253 0.2430 4.1250
Free cash flow/total assets1 194 0.1419 0.0962 -0.0329 1.1320
Debt/total assets 194 0.2275 0.1561 0.0037 1.5379
R&D/sales 159 0.0341 0.0529 0.0010 0.6050
Advertising/sales 101 0.0301 0.0338 0.0002 0.2232
Insider ownership2 156 0.0678 0.1086 0.0500 0.5000
Foreign sales/total sales 142 0.3035 0.1551 0.0000 0.7500
Size of investment ($ million) 121 130.4900 217.4000 5.0000 1500.0000
Firm Size ($ million) 194 5687.6800 9583.9700 108.9400 57981.9800
B. High q firms3
Tobin’s q 61 1.4264 0.5737 1.0000 4.1250
Free cash flow/total assets 61 0.1644 0.1422 0.0149 1.1320
Debt/total assets 61 0.2208 0.2123 0.0037 1.5379
R&D/sales 47 0.0603 0.0881 0.0033 0.6050
Advertising/sales 41 0.0473 0.0448 0.0046 0.2232
Insider ownership 48 4.8604 7.8135 0.0500 0.4000
Foreign sales/total sales 45 34.9330 13.8480 0.0600 0.6000
Size of investment ($ million) 41 88.1720 104.8700 7.3000 600.0000
Firm Size ($ million) 61 6660.5200 9863.4200 227.9200 57981.5800
C. Low q firms
Tobin’s q 133 0.5948 0.1867 0.2430 0.9750
Free cash flow/total sales 133 0.1315 0.0632 -0.0329 0.3624
Debt/total assets 133 0.2306 0.1230 0.0125 0.6598
R&D/sales 112 0.0231 0.0189 0.0010 0.1066
Advertising/sales 60 0.1849 0.0154 0.0002 0.0753
Insider ownership 108 7.6472 11.9080 0.0500 0.5000
Foreign sales/total sales 97 28.2260 15.8500 0.0000 0.7500
Size of investment ($ million) 80 152.1700 254.5900 5.0000 1500.0000
Firm size ($ million) 133 5241.4900 9457.2800 108.9400 56703.4600
1 The free cash flow is defined as in Lehn and Poulsen (1989) (i.e. operating income before depreciation minus 
interest expense, taxes, preferred dividends, and common dividends).
1 It is defined as the percent of outstanding shares held by insiders. The data are collected from several issues 
of the Value Line Investment Survey.
3 High flow) q indicates value-maximizing (overinvesting) firms.
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McConnell and Servaes (1990), Servaes (1991)], or firm’s investment opportunities [Lang, 
Stulz, and Walkling (1991)], firm value [Morck, Shliefer, and Vishny (1988)].
Lang and Litzenberger (1989) use Tobin’s q to distinguish value-maximizing from 
overinvesting firms. In their study, Tobin’s q is defined as the marginal return on firm’s 
existing assets plus the marginal return on future investment opportunities.35 It is also 
assumed that marginal returns of capital are diminishing, implying that the marginal 
return on existing assets is larger than marginal return on new investment. According to 
Lang and Litzenberger (1989), for value-maximizing firms, marginal returns on new 
investment are equal to (or larger than) the cost of capital. Under conditions of decreasing 
marginal efficiency of capital, the marginal return on existing assets is also larger than 
the cost of capital. Thus, Tobin’s q is larger than unity. On the other hand, for 
overinvesting firms (i.e., firms with poor investment opportunities), the marginal return 
on existing assets is less than the cost of capital.36 Under conditions of decreasing 
marginal efficiency of capital, the marginal return on new investment is also less than cost
35 average Tobin’s q = (X/C)/K + [(I/C)/K] (P - K) T
= average returns on existing assets 
+ average returns on future investment
where
X: expected earnings from existing assets
C: current capital stock
K: cost o f capital
I: future investment
P: average returns for firm
T: time period
P > K = X/C > K = q > 1 value-maximizing 
X/C = P < K = q < 1 overinvesting
36 In reality, it is difficult to observe the marginal Tobin’s q so that it is common to use average Tobin’s
q-
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of capital. Thus, Tobin’s q is less than unity.
In this study, Tobin’s q is used to distinguish value-maximizing (i.e., q > 1) from 
overinvesting firms (i.e., q < 1) to test the implications of overinvestment hypothesis. 
Consistent with Jensen’s (1986) overinvestment hypothesis, for value-maximizing firms, 
marginal return on investments would be positive and thus increase the value of the firm. 
On the other hand, for overinvesting firms, the marginal return on investments would be 
negative and thus decrease shareholders wealth.
The procedure used by Lindenberg and Ross (L-R) (1981) to estimate Tobin’s q is 
very complicated in terms of computational efforts and data requirements. That is, 
replacement costs are complex to estimate.37 The information about replacement costs 
of plant and inventory is available only for large firms over the period of 1974-1984.38 
In addition, some databases are available only for manufacturing firms.39 Chung and 
Pruitt (1994) developed a simple formula to approximate L-R’s Tobin’s q.40 The 
advantages of the approximate q are that (1) all data needed to calculate the Tobin’s q can 
be obtained from the Compustat Industrial files and (2) it is simple to calculate q values.
37 The replacement costs are calculated by approximating the plant’s age and life and then adjusting its 
book value for inflation. The replacement value o f  inventory is determined by assuming that the book 
value of inventory equals its market value when firm uses first-in first-out (FIFO) accounting.
38 During the period of 1974-1984, only firms with net plant and equipment values in excess o f $120 
million were required to report replacement costs o f plant and inventory to the FASB.
39 For instance, Manufacturing Master File complied by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
40 approximate q = (MVE PS + DEBT)/TA
where
MVE : product of a firm’s share price and the number o f common stock shares outstanding, given 
by COMPUSTAT (#24 x #25)
PS : the liquidating value of the firm’s outstanding preferred stock (#10)
DEBT: short-term (less than 1 year) liabilities net o f short-term assets (#5 - #4)
TA : book value of the total assets (#6)
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To show how the value of approximate q are close to the L-R Tobin’s q, Chung and 
Pruitt (1994) run yearly OLS regression between q values from both the L-R and 
approximate q formulas from 1978 to 1987. Their approximation of q can explain 96.6% 
of the variability of the L-R Tobin’s q. They also show the comparison of L-R’s Tobin’s 
q with approximate q for forty randomly selected firms, in which the two methods give 
very close value with deviation less than 18%. The high degree of observed consistency 
between the L-R and the approximate q formulas over the 1978-1987 time period strongly 
suggests that researchers can employ approximate q values with considerable confidence. 
The approximate q is used here to distinguish between value-maximizing (i.e., q > 1) and 
overinvesting firms (i.e., q < 1).
b. Estimation of Abnormal Stock Returns
To measure the announcement effects of investments, the event study methodology 
[Brown and Warner (1985)] is used to obtain the abnormal returns. The initial 
announcement date is designated as day 0 in event time and is verified by the Wall Street 
Journal Index. The market model is used to estimate normal or expected common stock 
returns. In the ordinary least squares model, returns on a given security are regressed 
against the concurrent returns of the market. The CRSP equally weighted index is used 
as a proxy for the market portfolio.
The market model is specified as:
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Rj, =  aj +  bj R™ +  eJt 
where
Rj, : the rate of return on security j for event fay t
ai : estimation period intercept of firm j
bj : OLS estimates of firm j ’s market model parameters
R™, : the rate of return on the CRSP equally valued index on event day t
ejt : the error term of security j on the event day t
The potential for bias of the OLS br  due to nonsynchronous trading and infrequent 
trading, has been recognized [Eades, Hess, and Kim (1984)]. To correct this bias, the
method developed by Scholes and Williams (1977) is used to estimate the OLS b,.41 The
abnormal returns for an announcing firm are the differential between the actual returns 
on its common stock and the contemporaneous expected return generated by the market 
model. The abnormal returns for the common stock of firm j on day t are obtained as 
follows:
A R jt =  Rjt - ( a j - b j R ^ , )  
where
ARj, : abnormal return for firm j on event day t
R j,: daily return of firm j common stock on event day t
Rn,, : daily return on the CRSP equally-weighted index for all common stocks on
41 Scholes and Williams (1977) develop a method of estimating parameters using daily returns in case 
of nonsynchronous or infrequent tradings.
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NYSE and AMEX (used as a proxy of the market portfolio of risky assets) on 
event day t 
aj : estimation period intercept of firm j 
bj : OLS estimates of firm j ’s market model parameters
The estimation period is from t = -120 to -30 relative to the first date of
announcement in the Wall Street Journal Index, day t = 0 for the domestic plant 
announcements. Daily abnormal returns are calculated for each firm in the sample over 
the time interval t = -15 to t = +15.
For a sample of N firms, the daily average abnormal return for each day t is estimated
by
In the case of no abnormal returns, AR, has an expected value of zero.
Analysis of statistical significance requires the standardization of abnormal returns to 
reflect statistical errors in the determination of expected returns. To determine whether 
the average daily abnormal return is statistically significantly different from zero, the 
average standardized abnormal return (ASAR,) is calculated.
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A SA R C= — Y '  *[ ^ 2 1 )  
c Sj t
where
gJt=(sj( + ))*/*T7 r
i= l
and
S2j : the residual variance for security j from the market model regression 
N : the number of observations during the estimation period 
R,,,, : the returns on the market portfolio for the event day t 
R„, : the average return of the market portfolio for the estimation period 
R^j : the average return of the market portfolio for day i during the estimation period 
T : the number of days in the estimation period
It is assumed that each of the abnormal returns is normally and independently 
distributed across securities.
For each day, the following t-statistic is computed:
t= y/N (ASARt )
To examine whether the cumulative average daily abnormal returns are significantly
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different from zero, the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for each security j, CAR,, 
are calculated by summing average abnormal returns over event time as follows:
CA*j.K.Ls ' tA R jt
t=K
where the CARj K L is for the period from t = day K until t = day L.
The cumulative average abnormal returns over the event time from day K until day 
L aie calculated by
“ ASjr.rriE CMj.K.L
The average standardized cumulative abnormal returns over the interval K to L are 
obtained as follows:
L
ASCARKi l=J2 a s a r k l
K
The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for several interval windows around the 
announcement day are calculated.
Finally, t-statistics are calculated for CARKL by
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t=y/N(ASCARKiL) /y /K-L+1
V. Empirical Results 
A. Overinvestment Hypothesis Tests
Panel A of Table 1-4 presents the daily average abnormal returns during the period 
of -5 to +5 days around the announcement day for the entire sample of domestic 
investment (plant) announcements from 1980 to 1992.
[Insert Table 1-4 about here]
One day before announcement (day = -1), firms experience significant negative 
abnormal returns of -0.37% (t-statistic = -2.330). However, the average abnormal returns 
at the announcement day (day = 0) are insignificant negative (-0.23%). Panel B of Table 
1-4 shows that the cumulative average abnormal returns for several window intervals are 
significantly negative. This evidence suggests that capital markets’ response to corporate 
investment announcements is negative. Similar negative returns for corporate investments 
are also reported in the study of acquisitions [Dodd (1980), Malatesta (1983)]. However, 
the evidence reported in Table 1-4 is not consistent with McConnell and Muscarella’s 
(1985) findings in which an increase in capital expenditures enhances firm value by
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Table 1-4
A. Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AARS), t-statistics, % of Positive AARs for the Entire Sample 
of Domestic Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms for Event Period of -5 to +5 Trading Days: 
1980-1992 (Sample Size = 194). ***,*♦,* denote the significance at the 1%, 5%,  10% level.
Day Average Abnormal t-statistics (p-value) Positive AAR(%)
Returns, AAR
-5 -0.0025 -2.313(0.021)** 43.8
-4 0.0009 0.453(0.650) 4S.5
-3 •0.0003 •0.160(0.872) 48.4
-2 0.0010 0.755(0.450) 49.5
-1 -0.0037 -2.330(0.020)** 37.6
0 -0.0023 -0.868(0.386) 42.8
+1 -0.0023 -1.377(0.169) 49.5
+2 -0.0000 0.277(0.781) 51.5
+3 0.0008 1.057(0.291) 48.4
+4 0.0022 2.134(0.034)** 54.1
+5 •0.0020 -1.095(0.274) 44.8
B. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs), t-statistics for the Entire Sample of Domestic 
Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms for Several Window Intervals: 1980-1992 (Sample Size 
= 194) ***,**,* denote the significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
Trading Cumulative Average t-statistics(p-value)
Interval Abnormal Returns
[-5 to +5] •0.0080 -1.050(0.294)
[-5 to +1] -0.0091 -2.219(0.027)**
[-2 to +1] -0.0073 -1.920(0.056)**
[-1 to +1] -0.0083 -2.656(0.008)*"
[ - l t o  0 ] -0.0060 -2.273(0.024)**
[ 0 to +1] 0.0046 1.596(0.111)
Note: Day 0 is the first announcement date associated with domestic investments by U.S. firms as 
reported in the Wall Street Journal.
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1.21 %.
Although the results in Table 1-4 appear to be consistent with Jensen’s (1986) 
overinvestment hypothesis, the sample may include different types of firms with respect 
to investment opportunities or level of free cash flows. The overinvestment hypothesis 
implies that the valuation effects of corporate investment decisions depend on firm’s 
investment opportunities. Using Tobin’s q as the measure of firm’s investment 
opportunities, the sample is divided into two subsamples - value-maximizing and 
overinvesting firms. Value-maximizing (i.e., q > 1) firms are expected to be better 
managed and have positive NPV projects, whereas overinvesting (i.e., q < 1) firms are 
likely to have no positive NPV projects. Hence, the overinvestment hypothesis predicts 
that investment announcements by value-maximizing firms gain positive market returns, 
while investment announcements by overinvesting firms suffer negative market returns.
Panel A of Table 1-5 provides the daily average abnormal returns for value- 
maximizing and overinvesting firms.
[Insert Table 1-5 about here]
One day before the investment announcement (day = -1). value-maximizing firms 
experience significant positive abnormal returns of 0.45% (t-statistic = 2.297). At the 
announcement day (day = 0), these firms gain significant positive abnormal returns of 
0.38% (t-statistic = 1.987). On the other hand, at day -1, overinvesting firms realize 
significant negative abnormal returns of -0.74% (t-statistic = 4.499). At the announcement
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Table I-S
A. Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AARS), % of the Positive AARs for the Domestic Investment 
Announcements by U.S. Firms with q > 1 and q < 1, the t-statistics for the Daily Mean Differences of AARs 
Between Two Samples for the Event Period -5 to 45 Trading Days: 1980-1992 (t-statistics are in 
parentheses). •**,**.* denote the significance at the 1%, 5% , 10% level.
Average Abnormal Returns, AAR,(%) 
Day Tobin’s q
q > 1 q < 1
Positive AAR(%) 
q > 1 q < 1
t-difTerence 
AAR,,, - AAR,,,
(N=61) (N=133)
-5 -0.0033(-1.884)‘ -0.0020(-1.466) 42.6 44.4 -0.463
-4 0.0017( 0.650) 0.0006( 0.417) 50.8 48.9 0.319
-3 -0.0009(-0.279) 0.0001( 0.126) 50.8 47.4 -0.293
-2 0.0027( 0.450) 0.0002( 0.848) 54.1 47.4 0.678
-1 0.0045( 2.297)*" -0.0074(-4.499)*“ 54.1 30.1 4.263*"
0 0.0038( 1.987)" -0.0051(-2.521)*“ 52.5 38.3 3.514"*
41 -0.0025(-0.493) -0.0022(-1.224) 52.5 48.1 -0.076
42 -0.0027(-0.983) 0.0012( 0.988) 47.5 53.3 -1.139
43 0.0007( 0.409) 0.0010( 0.929) 45.9 49.6 -0.111
44 0.0057( 2.964)*" 0.0005( 0.393) 59.0 51.8 1.611*
45 0.0009( 0.498) -0.0033(-1.682)‘ 47.5 43.6 1.171
B. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) for the Domestic Investment Announcements by Firms 
with q > 1 and q < 1, the t-statistics for the Mean Difference of CAARs Between Two Samples for Several 
Window Intervals: 1980-1992 (t-statistics are in parentheses). ***,•*,* denote the significance at the 1%, 
5%, 10% level.
Trading Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns, CAAR (%) t-Difference
Interval q > 1 q < 1 CAAR,,, - CAAR,,,
(N=61) (N=133)
[-5 to +5] 0.0107(1.482) -0.0166(-2.260)** 2.814*"
[-5 to -1-1] 0.0060(0.692) -0.0159(-3.130)“ * 2.832*”
[-2 to -4-1] 0.0086(2.036)" -0.0146(-3.677)*" 4.233*"
[-1 to -fl] 0.0059(2.273)" -0.0148(-4.719)*" 5.118*"
[-1 to 0] 0.0083(3.160)*" -0.0126(-4.859)*" 6.257*"
[ 0 to 4-1] 0.0013(1.109) -0.0070(-2.663)” 2.751*"
Notes: (1) Day 0 is the first announcement date associated with domestic investments as reported in the Wall 
Street Journal.
(2) if the value of the Tobin’s q is greater (less) than 1, the firm is classified into value-maximizing 
(overinvesting) firm.
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day, these firms also suffer significant negative abnormal returns of -0.51% (t-statistic = - 
2.521). The mean differences between value-maximizing and overinvesting firms are 
statistically significant at the 1% level for both days (-1, 0). This evidence implies that 
the capital markets expect more value to be created when firms with profitable investment 
opportunities announce their investment plans compared to firms with poor investment 
opportunities (i.e., overinvesting firms).
Panel B of Table 1-5 presents cumulative average abnormal returns for value- 
maximizing (i.e., q > 1) and overinvesting (i.e., q < 1) firms for several interval windows 
around the announcement day. The results show that value-maximizing firms have 
significant positive two-day abnormal returns of 0.83% (t-statistic = 3.160), while 
overinvesting firms experience significant negative two-day abnormal returns of -1.26% 
(t-statistic = -4.859). The mean difference for the two-day abnormal returns between the 
two subsamples is statistically significant at the 1% level. This evidence indicates that 
investment announcements by value-maximizing firms exhibit positive valuation effects 
because the capital market believes that these firms are likely to undertake positive NPV 
projects. On the other hand, investment announcements by overinvesting firms have 
negative valuation effects because these firms are more likely to waste cash flows by 
engaging in negative NPV projects. This is consistent with the prediction of the 
overinvestment hypothesis. Although not in the context of plant investments, Servaes 
(1991) finds that bidder abnormal returns are higher for high q firms (i.e., q > 1).
Jensen’s (1986) argument implies that stock market returns associated with firm’s 
investment opportunities depend on free cash flows. That is, since value-maximizing firms
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are likely to use cash flows productively, no significant relation between the level of cash 
flows and investment-related abnormal returns is expected. On the other hand, since 
overinvesting firms are more likely to waste cash flows in negative NPV investments, the 
level of free cash flows may have an adverse impact on the value of the firm. Thus, the 
overinvestment hypothesis implies that, cross-sectionally, the abnormal returns must be 
negatively related to the cash flows of overinvesting firms and unrelated to the cash flows 
of value-maximizing firms.
To explore this implication of the overinvestment hypothesis, this study examines the 
cross-sectional relation between the level of free cash flows and the stock market returns 
for a sample of value-maximizing and overinvesting firms, respectively. Panel A of Table 
1-6 reports the results from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of the two-day 
cumulative abnormal returns for the announcements of domestic investments (plants) on 
the free cash flows.
[ Insert Table 1-6 about here]
For value-maximizing firms, the relation between the two-day abnormal returns and 
free cash flows is insignificantly positive (2.42%) (t-statistic = 1.303). For overinvesting 
firms, the two-day abnormal returns are negative related to cash flows (-0.67%) (t-statistic 
= 2.208). This evidence indicates that firms with profitable investment opportunities use 
cash flows productively, while firms with poor investment opportunities are likely to 
overinvest corporate free cash flows. These findings are consistent with the prediction of
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Table 1-6
A. OLS Estimates of Coefficients in Cross-Sectional Regressions of the Two-day 
(-1,0) Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR.,0) for the Domestic Investment 
Announcements by U.S. Firms: 1980-1992 (t-statistics are in parentheses). ♦**,**,* 
denote the significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
CAR(.10)q>i = a0 + a, FCF
CAR(.,i0)q<, -  a0 + a, FCF
Tobin’s q sample size Intercept Free'cash flow* R2 (%)
q > 1 61 0.0436 0.0242 3.62
(1.050) (1.303)
q < 1 133 -0.0038 -0.0067 3.59
(-0.849) (-2.208)**
B. OLS Estimates of Coefficients in Cross-Sectional Regressions of the Two-day 
(-1,0) Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR.,0) for the Domestic Investment 
Announcements by U.S. Firms: 1980-1992 (t-statistics are in parentheses). ***,**,* 
denote the significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
CAR.,i0 = ao + a, Tobin’s q + a2 FCF
regl reg2 reg3
intercept -0.0129
(-3.979)***
-0.0003
(-0.129)
-0.0074
(-2.069)**
Tobin’s q 0.0081
(2.510)’**
0.0086
(2.728)***
Free cash 
flow
-0.0357
(-3.007)“ *
-0.0373
(-3.191)**’
R2 (%) 3.18 4.50 8.08
1 The free cash flow is defined as operating income before depreciation minus interest expenses,
taxes, preferred dividends, and common dividends, all of which is divided by total assets for the 
fiscal year before the investments [Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991)].
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overinvestment hypothesis and the empirical evidence reported by Lang, Stulz, and 
Walkling (1991) on the relationship between abnormal returns and cash flows from 
domestic acquisitions.
Panel B of Table 1-6 presents estimates of regressions of two-day abnormal returns 
from the investment announcements on Tobin’s q and free cash flows for the entire 
sample over the entire period. The first regression shows that the Tobin’s q coefficient 
is positively related to the stock market returns, implying that domestic investments by 
value-maximizing firms increase shareholder wealth. In the second regression, the relation 
between abnormal returns and the level of free cash flows is negative and significant. It 
implies that, as Jensen (1986) argues, the role of free cash flows available to managers 
is an important factor in explaining the negative relationship between investment 
abnormal returns and cash flows. The negative relationship between abnormal returns and 
the cash flows is retained even in the presence of the Tobin’s q variable. This result is 
reported in the last column of the same Table.
Further, whether the abnormal returns associated with free cash flows differ for value- 
maximizing and overinvesting firms is examined. Table 1-7 presents a 2 x 2 matrix in 
which the sample of firms is classified according to Tobin’s q and free cash flows.
[Insert Table 1-7 about here]
The results show that value-maximizing firms (i.e., q > 1) with high free cash flows 
appear to earn most significant positive returns of 1.02% (t-statistic = 2.869), implying
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Table 1-7
Two-Day (-1,0) Cumulative Average Abnormal Stock Returns (CAR., 0), Classified 
by Tobin’s q1 and Free Cash Flow2: Domestic Investments by U.S. Firms: 1980- 
1992. All data are obtained from COMPUSTAT. (t-statistics are in parentheses) ***, 
**, * denote the significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
High FCF Low FCF Mean
Tobin’s q Firms Firms Difference
0.0102 0.0072 0.0030
q > 1 (2.869)*** (1.483) (0.8540)
N=36 N=25
-0.0155 -0.0094 -0.0061
q < i (-4.296)*** (-2.575)** (-1.587)
N=67 N=66
Mean 0.0257 0.0166
Difference (5.5650)*** (3.1330)***
1 Tobin’s q is calculated using the formula provided by Chung and Pruitt (1994). 
q > 1 (q < 1) indicates value-maximizing (overivesting) firms.
2 Free cash flows are estimated using the definition given by Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and Lang, Stulz, 
Walkling (1991). Specifically, free cash flows are defined as operating income before depreciation minus 
interest expense, taxes, preferred and common dividends, all of which are divided by the book value of 
total assets for the fiscal year before the investment The sample median (0.1339) of free cash flows is 
used to classify firms into the high and low free cash flow categories.
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that these firms create more wealth with cash flows. Also, regardless of the level of free 
cash flows, capital markets respond positively to the investment announcements by value- 
maximizing firms. On the other hand, overinvesting firms (i.e., q < 1) with high free cash 
flows incur significant negative returns of -1.55% (t-statistic -4.296). This evidence 
suggests that these firms have the greatest agency problems over the distribution of free 
cash flows. In addition, capital markets seem to respond more vigorously to the 
investment announcements of overinvesting firms with high cash flows.
B. Type of Investment Tests
B l. Comparison of Valuation Effects Between Focus-Increasing and Diversifying 
Investments
Although not in the context of plant investments, previous studies [Morck, Shliefer, 
and Vishny (1990), Lang and Stulz (1994), John and Ofek (1995)] have presented 
evidence in favor of the view that an increase in corporate focus is associated with 
shareholder wealth maximization.
This section examines the valuation effects of two different types of plant 
investments; that is, (1) focus-increasing and (2) diversifying investments. An investment 
is classified as a focus-increasing investment if the 2-digit SIC code of the investment is 
the same as the firm’s main COMPUSTAT 2-digit code. Otherwise, it is classified as a
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diversifying investment.42
Panel A of Table 1-8 presents the daily average returns for focus-increasing and 
diversifying investments for the eleven trading days around the investment announcements 
over the 1980-1992 period.
[Insert Table 1-8 about here]
At the announcement day, the abnormal returns for both samples appear to be 
insignificant. On the other hand, on the day before (day = -1), diversifying investments 
are associated with significant negative stock returns of -0.89% (t-statistic = -2.452), 
whereas focus-increasing investments are associated with insignificant positive returns. 
The results also show that mean differences between two samples are significantly 
different at the 1% level.
Panel B of Table 1-8 shows the cumulative abnormal returns for focus-increasing and 
diversifying investments for several window intervals around the two-day announcement 
period. Focus-increasing investments earn positive two-day abnormal returns of 0.09%, 
implying that an increase in corporate focus are associated with value-increasing activities. 
On the other hand, diversifying investments experience significant negative two-day 
abnormal returns of -1.14% (t-statistic = -1.662), implying that corporate diversifying 
investments are value-decreasing. Further, the mean differences between focus-increasing 
and diversifying investments for the two-day abnormal returns are significant at the 5%
42 This measure is also used in Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990), Kaplan and Weisbach (1992), John 
and Ofek (1995).
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Table 1-8
A. Comparison of Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AARs), % of Positive AARs for the Focus-Increasing and 
Diversifying Domestic Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms, t-statistics for the Daily Mean Differences 
of AARs Between Two Samples for the Event Period -5 to -1-5 Trading Days: 1980-1992. (t-statistics are in 
parentheses) *•*,**,* denote the significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
Average Abnormal Returns, AAR,(%) Positive AAR(%)
Day Focus-increasing Diversifying Focus-increasing Diversifying t-difference
investments investments investments investments
(N=129) (N=59) - AAR,
-5 -0.0027(-0.857) -0.005K-2.031)" 41.4 46.6 0.7906
-4 -0.0003( 0.074) 0.0032( 0.831) 48.3 51.2 -1.2566
-3 -0.0021( 0.624) -0.0017(-0352) 43.8 46.1 -13032
-2 •0.0002( 0.082) 0.0026( 0.428) 49.1 53.9 -0.8949
-1 0.0005( 0.095) -0.0089(-2.452)’~ 50.4 38.5 3.2665"*
0 0.0004( 0.086) -0.0025(-0.419) 51.6 47.7 0.7259
+1 -0.0020(-0.723) -0.0047(-1.435) 43.2 45.8 0.8684
+2 0.0004(-0.179) -0.0022(-0.177) 55.9 48.1 0.7921
+3 -0.0011(-0.543) 0.0029( 0.467) 42.5 533 -1.5164
+4 0.0018( 0.428) 0.0045( 1.132) 523 52.0 -0.8014
+5 -0.0007(-0.149) -0.0042(-1.110) 45.7 47.4 1.2469
B. Comparison of Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) for the Focus-Increasing and Diversifying 
Domestic Investment Announcements, t-statistics the Mean Difference of CAARs Between Tow Samples for 
Several Window Intervals: 1980-1992. (t-statistics are in parentheses) ***,**.» denote the significance at the 
1%, 5%, 10% level.
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns, CAAR (%)
t-Difference
Trading Focus-Increasing Diversifying C A A R ,^ - CAAR^,,
Intervals investments investments
(N=129) (N=59)
[-5 to +5] •0.0060( 0.803) -0.0127(-0.982) 03074
[-5 to +1] •0.0064( 0.824) -0.0137(-1.143) 0.7721
[-2 to -i-l] •0.0013( 0378) -0.0136(-0.945) 1.8271"
[-1 to 4-1] -0.0011( 0348) -0.0162(-2.110)" 2.7180*"
[-1 to 0] 0.0009( 0335) -0.0114(-1.662)’ 2.7234"
[ 0 to 4-1] -0.0016(-0.251) -0.0073(-0.632) 13030
Notes: (1) Day 0 is the First announcement date associated with domestic investments as reported in 
the Wall Street Journal.
(2) The investment is classified as focus-increasing if the 2-digit SIC code of the investment is 
the same as the firm’s main 2-digit SIC code (i.e. firm’s core business). Otherwise, it is 
classified as diversifying.
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level.
The findings in Table 1-8 appear to support the view that an increase in corporate 
focus is consistent with the market value maximization hypothesis [John and Ofek (1995), 
Comment and Jarrell (1995)], whereas corporate diversifying investments tend to decrease 
shareholder wealth. The negative stock reactions associated with diversifying investment 
announcements may be because diversifying investments are one way in which managers 
waste cash flows at the expense of shareholder wealth [Jensen (1986)]. Another possible 
explanation is that firms with poor investment opportunities in their core business are 
likely to engage in diversifying investments [Lang and Stulz (1994)]. The results in Table 
1-8 seems to be consistent as well with Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny’s (1990) findings of 
higher bidder returns from related acquisitions (2.38%), than bidder returns from unrelated 
acquisitions (-1.89%).
Further, this study examines the relation between the two-day abnormal returns and 
type of investment for value-maximizing and overinvesting firms. Panel A of Table 1-9 
presents the two-day abnormal returns for investments, classified by Tobin’s q and the 
type of investment.
[Insert Table 1-9 about here]
Focus-increasing investments by value-maximizing firms (i.e., q > 1) gain the highest 
two-day abnormal returns of 1.03% (t-statistic = 3.107), implying that focus-increasing 
investments by firms with profitable investment opportunities create more wealth. On the
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Table 1-9
Comparision of Cumulative Average Abnormal Stock Returns (CARs.,j,, CAR.,,,,) for Domestic 
Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms, Classified by Tobin’s q1 and type of Investment (focus- 
increasing vs diversifying)2 Classified by 2-Digit SIC Industry Code: 1980-1992. (t-statistics are in 
parentheses) ******  denote the significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
A. CAR (-1,0)
Focus-increasing Diversifying Mean Difference
0.0103 0.0075 0.0028
q > i (3.107)*" (1372) (0.436)
N=47 N=14
-0.0064 -0.0174 0.0110
q < i (-2.209)" (-3.736)*” (2348)"
N=82 N=45
Mean 0.0167 0.0249
Difference (4.236)*" (3.689)*“
B. CAR(-1,+1)
Focus-increasing Diversifying Mean Difference
0.0077 0.0058 0.0019
q > i (2.616)** (0.812) (0.177)
N=47 N=14
-0.0078 •0.0231 0.0153
q < i (-1.947)* (-4.360)*** (2.537)**
N=82 N=45
Mean 0.0155 0.0289
Difference (3367)*" (3.535)*”
1 q > 1 (q < 1) indicates value-maximizing (overinvesting) firms.
2 The investment is classified as focus-increasing if the 2-digit SIC code of the investment is the 
same as the firm’s main 2-digit SIC code (i.e. firm’s core business), otherwise, it is classified as 
diversifying.
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other hand, diversifying investments by overinvesting firms (i.e., q < 1) experience the 
lowest two-day abnormal returns of -1.74% (t-statistic = -3.736), suggesting that 
diversifying investments by firms with poor investment opportunities substantially 
decrease the value of the firm. This evidence may also suggest that firms that decreasing 
investment opportunities in their core-business engage in diversifying investments for 
survival reasons. However, capital markets appear to penalize these firms for such 
investments. Panel B of Table 1-9 provides evidence for the three-day abnormal returns. 
The findings are similar to those of panel A of Table 1-9.43
B2. Pre- and Post-Investment Profitability Performance
In a recent study by John and Ofek (1995), it is reported that firms with focus- 
increasing asset-sales improve performance, while firms with diversifying asset-sales do 
not. Using a sample of domestic investments, this study examines changes in pre- and 
post-performance of focus-increasing and diversifying firms.
To compare the mean and median change in profitability of firms with focus- 
increasing and firms with diversifying investments around the investment announcements, 
three measures of profitability are used: (1) earnings before interest, taxes, and 
depreciation (EBITD) to sales, (2) EBITD to book value of assets, and (3) EBITD to 
market value of equity. These ratios represent firm’s efficiency in operations [John and 
Ofek (1995)]. To account for industry changes on the firm’s performance, industry-
43 The results remain essentially the same even when an eleven-day abnormal return window (i.e., -5 
to +5) is used.
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adjusted profitability measures are used. The industry-adjusted measures are estimated by 
subtracting from the firm’s change the median changes over the same period for all firms 
in COMPUSTAT file with the same 2-digit SIC code.
Table I-10 presents the changes in pre- and post investment profitability of focus- 
increasing firms and diversifying firms.
[Insert Table I-10 about here]
In the first two columns of Table I-10, the mean and median of operating margins for 
focus-increasing firms are positive around investment announcements. The results show 
that the mean changes in EBITD to sales ratio are 0.79%, 3.53%, and 6.85% from year 
zero to year one, two, and three. This evidence indicates that firms with an increase in 
focus improve their performance after investments. On the other hand, the third and fourth 
columns of Table I-10 which report performance of firms with diversifying investments 
show that the mean changes in EBITD to sales ratio are -4.08%, -5.62%, and 7.80% from 
year zero to year one, two, and three. This result suggests that performance for firms with 
diversifying investments appear to be deteriorating. The other two profitability measures - 
changes in EBITD to assets (ROA) and change in EBITD to market value of equity - 
show similar results. These results are consistent with John and Ofek’s (1995) findings 
that, for firms with focus-increasing divestitures, the mean changes in EBITD to sales 
ratios are 0.7%, 1.3%, and 2.3% from year zero to year one, two, and three, respectively. 
For diversifying divestitures, the mean changes in EBITD to sales ratios are -1.7%, -2.9%,
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Table 1-10
Industry-adjusted Profitability Changes of Firms Around the Focus-Increasing and Diversifying Domestic 
Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms: 1980-1992. *,*•,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level.
Industry-Adjusted Focus-Increasing Diversifying Difference between Samples
Performance Investments Investments
Measures Mean Median1 Mean Median Mean Median
A. Change in operating margin(EBl’l  D/Sales)2
year -2 to -1 0.0755' 0.0079 0.0083 0.0019 0.0672' 0.0060
year -1 to 0 0.0934' 0.0768' •0.0114 -0.0138 0.1048’ 0.0966'
year 0 to +1 0.0079 0.0001 •0.0408 -0.0057 0.0487 0.0057
year 0 to +2 0.0353 0.0018 -0.0562 -0.0470 0.0915" 0.0650
year 0 to +3 0.0685 0.0273 -0.0780' -0.0598 C.14S5" 0.0871'
B. Change in returns on assets (ROA)2
year -2 to -1 0.0969' 0.0413 0.0333 0.0368 0.1670' 0.0045
year -1 to 0 0.1052' 0.0823' -0.0225 -0.0198 0.1277" 0.1021"
year 0 to -t-1 0.0015 0.0084 -0.0159 -0.0107 0.0174 0.0191
year 0 to +2 0.0461 0.0127 •0.0631 -0.0816' 0.1092" 0.0943'
year 0 to +3 0.0960' 0.0251 -0.1135" -0.0952' 0.2097" 0.1203”
C. Change in EBITD/market value of euqity4
year -2 to -1 0.0118 0.0021 -0.0251 -0.0357 0.0369 0.0378
year -1 to 0 0.0637 0.0793" •0.0291 -0.0229 0.0928" 0.1022"
year 0 to +1 0.0310 0.0112 -0.0948' •0.0409 0.1258" 0.0528"
year 0 to +2 0.0620 0.0634 -0.0446 •0.0508 0.1066" 0.1142"
year 0 to +3 0.0750 0.0518 •0.0779' -0.0551 0.1529" 0.1069'
1 Median singiflcance tests are based on the Wilcoxon signed rank test.
2 The difference between the change in operating margin from year to year and the median change in industry. The 
operating margin is defined as the ratio of EBITD (earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation) to sales.
5 The difference between the change in return on assets fron year to year and the median change in industry. The return 
on assets is the ratio of EBITD/book value of total assets.
4 The difference between the change in EBITD/market value of equity from year to year and the median change in the 
industry.
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and -3.0% from year zero to year one, two, and three, respectively. The evidence in Table 
I-10 supports the argument that, even though firms attempt to invest outside their core­
business in an effort to enhance their investment opportunities, firm performance is not 
likely to improve [Lang and Stulz (1994)].
B3. The Relation Between Change in Post-Performance and Change in Focus
This section examines the relation between the change in post-performance of 
investing firms and change in corporate focus. In this study, three focus measures are 
used.44 The first measure of focus is to examine whether or not the investment is related 
to the firm’s primary business. If the 2-digit SIC code of new investment is the same as 
the firm’s main 2-digit business, the investment is classified as a focus-increasing 
investment. Otherwise, investment is classified as a diversifying investment. The second 
focus measure used is the number of lines of business segments in which firms engage. 
The increase in the number of business segments indicates that the firm’s degree of 
diversification increases. The third focus measure used is the sales-based Herfindahl index 
which is defined as the sum of the squared values of sales per business segment as a 
proportion of total firm sales. A sales-based Herfindahl index reflects the degree of which 
sales are concentrated in a few of a company’s business segments.45 Hence, the
44 Sec John and Ofek (1995), Comment and Jarrell (1995) for discussion of alternative business focus 
measures.
45 See Lang and Stulz (1994) for a detailed description of the Herfindahl index as a measure of 
corporate focus.
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Herfindahl index falls as the degree of corporate diversification increases.46
Table I-11 reports the relation between the changes in profitability from year zero to 
year two and the change in corporate focus measures.
[Insert Table I -11 about here]
The first regression shows that firm’s profit margin is positively related to the focus 
dummy (16.93%), implying that focus-increasing investments raise firm’s profit margin. 
Similar results are obtained when the two alternative focus measures - changes in the 
number of business segments and Herfindahl index - are used. The results also show that 
when the number of business segments increases, the performance of the firms 
deteriorates. Similarly, an increase in the Herfindahl index tends to improve corporate 
profitability performance. The other two profitability measures - EBITD to assets and 
EBITD to market value of equity - also yield similar results 47 This evidence implies that 
investments that increase firm’s focus tend to improve its performance two years after the 
investment decision, whereas investments that do not increase the firm’s focus appear to 
worsen its performance. Although in context of divestitures, John and Ofek (1995) 
provide similar evidence which shows that changes in firm’s profitability are positively 
related to increase in corporate focus.
44 The data are obtained from Compustat Industry Business Segment file and the Directory of 
Multinationals.
47 The post-profitability results for a broader window interval (i.e., from year zero to year three) remain 
essentially similar to those presented in Table 1-11. When indicator variables are used to capture the 
change in the number of business segments and the Herfindahl index, the results remained unchanged.
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Table M l
The Relation Between the Change In Post-Performance of the Investing Finns and the Change 'n Focus Around the Domestic Investment 
Announcements by VS.  Firms: 1980-1992. (t-statistlcs are in parentheses) denote the significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
Dependent variable: Industry-adjusted change In EBITD/tales from year 0 to year 2'
regl reg2 reg3
Intercept -0.0827(-0.962) 0.2110(1.100) -0.1312t-l.387)
focus dummy3 0.1693(1.650)'
change in the number of segments3 -0.0500(-1.858r
change In the HerAndahl Index4 0.2782(1.899)"
R3(%) 1.63 2.15 2J3
Dependent variable: Industry-adjusted change In EBITD/assets from year 0 to year 2’
regl reg2 reg3
intercept -0.0976(.1.166) 0.0952(1J53) -0.1280(-1.708)
focus dummy 0.1937(1.932)"
change In the number of segments -0.0327M.728)’
change In the HerAndahl Index 0.2026(1.759)*
R3(%) 2.19 1.84 1.91
Dependent variable: Industry-adjusted change In EBITD/market value of equity from year 0 to year 2‘
regl reg2 *tg3
intercept -0.0504(-0.930) 0.1291(1.008) -0.0993H.458)
focus dummy 0.1137(1.764)’
change In the number of segments -0.0296M.718)'
change in the HerAndahl Index 0.2293(2.194)"
R3(%) 1.84 1.83 2.92
' The difference between the change in the investing firm’s EBITD/sales from year 0 so year 2 and the median change in 
the industry.
3 Focus dummy is 1 if the 2-digit SIC code of investment is the same as the firm’s main 2-digit SIC code (i.e. Arm’s core 
business), and 0 otherwise.
3 The change in the number of segments from year -1 to 0
4 Change in the HerAndahl index from years -I to 0. The HerAndahl index is calculated as the sum of segments’ sales 
squared, divided by total sales squared.
9 The difference between the change in the investing firm’s EBITD/assets from year 0 to year 2 and the median change in 
the industry.
4 The difference between the change in the Investing Arm’s EBITD/market value of equity from year 0 to year 2 and the
median change in the industry.
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B4. The Relation Between Two-Day Stock Market Returns and Change in Focus
While Table 1-11 examines the relation between firm’s performance and the changes 
in corporate focus, Table 1-12 analyzes the relation between the two-day cumulative 
abnormal returns and the changes in focus. The two-day cumulative abnormal returns are 
used as market’s immediate assessment of the firm’s profitability in response to its 
investment announcements.
[Insert Table 1-12 about here]
The first regression shows that the focus dummy is positively related to the two-day 
abnormal returns (0.59%) (t-statistic = 1.621), suggesting that focus-increasing 
investments have 0.59% higher returns than diversifying investments. In the second 
regression, the change in the number of business segment variable is inversely related to 
the two-day abnormal returns (-0.32%) (t-statistic = -3.456) as expected. It implies that 
focus-increasing (i.e., when the number of segments decreases) investments are value- 
increasing, while diversifying investments tend to destroy shareholder value. The third 
regression reports a positive relation between the two-day abnormal returns and the 
change in Herfindahl index. This evidence indicates that investment abnormal returns are 
higher when firm’s Herfindahl index increases.48
48 The results remain similar in Table 1-12, even when indicator variables are used to capture the 
changes in the number o f business segments and the Herfindahl index from year -1 to zero.
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Table 1-12
The Relation Between the Investing Finn’s Two-Day Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (CARs.10) and the Change in Focus around the Domestic Investment 
Announcements by U.S. Firms: 1980-1992 (t-statistics are in parentheses) * * * * * *  
denote the significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
Dependent variable: Two-day Cumulative Abnormal Returns
regl rcg2 reg3
observation 191 184 178
intercept -0.0094(-3.086)*’* 0.0056(1.611) -0.0082(-2.025)**
focus dummy1 0.0059(1.621)*
change in the number of segments2 -0.0032(-3.456)“*
change in the Herfindahl index3 0.0065(1.945)**
R2 (%) 1.37 6.16 6.20
1 Focus dummy is 1 if the 2-digit SIC code of investment is the same as the firm’s main 2-digit 
SIC code (i.e. firm’s core business), and 0 otherwise.
2 The change in the number of segments from year -1 to 0.
3 Change in the Herfindahl index from years -1 to 0. The Herfindahl index is calculated as the 
sum of segments’ sales squared, divided by total sales squared.
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C. Cross-Sectional Analysis
Table 1-13 provides cross-sectional regression analysis results accounting for other 
potential factors such as firm’s characteristics, size of investment, and taxes.
[Insert Table 13 about here]
The first regression shows the relation between the two-day abnormal returns and a 
set of dummy variables for the type of investment and the firm’s investment opportunities. 
Value-maximizing firms (i.e., high q) with focus-increasing investments realize significant 
positive abnormal returns (t-statistic = 5.196), whereas overinvesting firms (i.e., low q) 
engaging in diversifying investments experience significant negative abnormal returns (t- 
statistic = -4.261). Thus, focus-increasing investments increase shareholder wealth , while 
diversifying investments decrease it.
In the second regression, the negative relation between the level of free cash flows 
and the two-day abnormal stock returns indicates that agency costs between managers and 
shareholders rise as high free cash flows increase, supporting the prediction of the 
overinvestment hypothesis.
The impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on the value of the firm is also examined 
in the third regression. The change in interest allocation rules introduced by the Tax
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Table M 3
Cross-sectional Regressions of the Two-day Announcement Period Abnormal Returns (CAR.,^) on 
the Firm and Investment Characteristics for Domestic Investments by U.S. Firms: 1980-1992 (t- 
statistics are in parentheses) ***,**,* denote the significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.
variable reg 1
(N=191)
reg 2
(N=194)
reg 3
(N=194)
reg4
(N=70)
intercept -0.0024
(-0.618)
-0.0003
(-0.129)
-0.0077
(-3.420)“
■0.0076
(-0.490)
high q/focus' 0.0226
(5.195)“
0.0128
(1.609)‘
high q/div1 0.0077
(1391)
0.0070
(0.737)
low q/div3 •0.0115
(-4.261)”
-0.0087
(-1.631)'
free cash flow -0.0357
(-3.007)“
-0.0202
(1328)*
Tax4 0.0040
(1.147)
0.0009
(0.097)
size of 
investment
0.0000
(1319)
log(asset) -0.0027
(-0.535)
debt/assets 0.0162
(0.842)
ownership9 0.0001
(0.620)
foreign sales/ 
total sales
0.0002
(1346)
log(flrm size) 0.0025
(0.416)
R1 ( % ) 16.10 4.50 0.69 34.76
1 The high q/focus is 1 if value-maximizing firms with focus-increasing investments , and 0 
otherwise.
2 high q/div is 1 if value-maximizing firms with diversifyign investment, and 0 otherwise.
3 low q/div is 1 if overinvesting firms with diversifying investments, and 0 otherwise.
4 Tax is 1 if investments are made after 1986 Tax Reform, and 0 otherwise.
3 It is defined as percent of outstanding shares held by insiders.
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Reform Act of 1986 reduced tax deductibility of the U.S. interest expenses.49 Thus, it 
is argued that the Tax Reform Act might have increased the firm’s cost of capital and 
thus decrease its investment activities. The evidence in the third regression shows that 
changes in the Tax Reform Act in 1986 do not have any influence on the value of the 
firm around the two-day investment announcement period.
The fourth regression examines whether the two-day abnormal returns for corporate 
investments are related to several other firm characteristics. It is predicted that, as firm’s 
debt increases, managers are more closely monitored by creditors and have less cash 
flows to undertake sub-optimal or value-decreasing investments [Jensen (1986)]. This 
argument implies a positive relation between the stock market returns and firm’s debt 
ratios. Also, if managers have a large stake in the firm, they are less likely to invest in 
negative NPV projects, predicting a positive relation between the two-day abnormal 
returns and the proportion of shares held by managers [Lewellen, Loderer, and Rosenfeld
(1985)].50 In addition, there is the argument that, since large firms have more resources, 
larger internal capital markets, and economies of scale, firm size may be relevant in 
explaining the abnormal returns associated with new domestic investments. Thus, the 
coefficient of the firm size variable is expected to be positive. Even though the firm’s 
debt ratio, the fraction of ownership held by managers, and the firm size variables have
49 In the Tax Reform Act o f 1986, the U.S. government sought to limit how much interest expense 
multinational firms can deduct from their U.S. income. The loss of tax deductibility o f  interest 
expense might lead multinational firms to borrow and invest less, scaling back the scope o f their 
foreign and total operations.
30 Lewellen, Loderer, and Rosenfeld (1985) show that bidder returns increase with the faction o f bidder 
equity held by managers.
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coefficients estimates of the same sign as predicted, none of the coefficients appear to be 
significant at any conventional level.
The evidence in Table 1-13 also indicates that size of investment, firm’s asset size, 
and ratios of foreign sales to total sales appear to have little power to explain the stock 
market returns for investments. Overall, the evidence shows that firm’s investment 
opportunities (i.e. value-maximizing and overinvesting) and type of investment (focus- 
increasing and diversifying) are important determinants of gains from domestic 
investments.
VI. Concluding Remarks
This paper examines the effects of corporate investment decisions on the value of the 
firm, using a sample of domestic plant announcements by U.S. firms during the period 
of 1980-1992. In this paper, two possible explanations associated with the valuation 
effects of investments are considered: (1) firm’s investment opportunities and (2) type of 
investment (focus-increasing and diversifying). The overinvestment hypothesis [Jensen
(1986)] implies that the impact of corporate investments on the value of the firm depends 
on the firm’s investment opportunities [Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991), Servaes (1991)] 
and the agency costs associated with the managerial discretion of corporate free cash 
flows. In addition, following Lang and Stulz (1994), it is expected that focus-increasing 
investments are value-increasing activities, while diversifying investments are value- 
destroying activities.
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In this study, the evidence is consistent with predictions of overinvestment hypothesis. 
That is, value-maximizing firms realize positive stock returns for domestic investment 
announcements, whereas overinvesting firms suffer losses. In addition, for overinvesting 
firms, the relation between the two-day abnormal returns and the level of free cash flows 
is significantly negative, indicating that agency costs increase with the level of free cash 
flows as predicted by the overinvestment hypothesis.
The evidence on the effects of the type of investment on the value of the firm shows 
that focus-increasing investments increase shareholder wealth, while diversifying 
investments do not. That is, an increase in corporate focus is consistent with shareholder 
wealth maximization [Kaplan and Weisbach (1992), Comment and Jarrell (1995), John 
and Ofek (1995)]. In addition, pre- and post-performance tests provide evidence which 
shows that focus-increasing investments tend to improve corporate performance, while 
diversifying investments do not. This evidence appears to support the view [Lang and 
Stulz (1994)] that diversifying investments are not value-increasing.
The cross-sectional analysis confirms these results. That is, the firm’s investment 
opportunities and type of investment are important determinants of the valuation effects 
of corporate investment decisions. However, other control variables such size of 
investment, taxes, ratio of foreign sales to total sales, fraction of shares held by managers, 
and firm size are found to have little explanatory power.
Unlike previous studies which do not consider the firm’s investment opportunities and 
the type of investments [Jensen and Ruback (1983), McConnell and Muscarella (1985), 
Blackwell, Marr, and Spivey (1990)], this study provides evidence which shows that
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firm’s investment opportunities and the type of investment pursued by corporate managers 
can explain why investment decisions may not always increase shareholder wealth .
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Abstract
This paper examines the valuation effects of corporate investment decisions for a 
sample of foreign plant announcements by U.S. firms during the period 1980-1992. It is 
found that value-maximizing firms (i.e., q > 1) earn significant positive abnormal returns, 
while overinvesting firms (i.e., q < 1) experience significant negative abnormal returns. 
Especially, for overinvesting firms, there are significant agency costs associated with 
managers’ discretion of free cash flows. This evidence appears to support overinvestment 
hypothesis. This study shows that diversifying investments decrease the value of the firm, 
while focus-increasing investments do not, implying that increase in corporate focus is 
consistent with shareholder wealth maximization. Further, it is found no difference in 
abnormal returns between domestic and foreign investments. Accordingly, firm’s 
investment opportunities and the type of investments are important determinants of gains 
from corporate investments.
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I. Introduction
Essay I provided evidence on the valuation effects of domestic plant investment on 
the value of the firm. In Essay II, the valuation effects of foreign plant investment are 
examined. Foreign direct investments include mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, and 
wholly-owned plants. Even though U.S. firms have long been building plants abroad, the 
effects of the foreign plants on shareholder wealth have received little attention relative 
to acquisitions and joint-ventures.1
Several theories have attempted to explain why firms invest abroad. The 
internalization hypothesis suggests that foreign investment occurs when a firm is able to 
increase its value by internalizing markets for its intangible firm-specific assets such as 
management expertise, patent, and marketing skills.2 The imperfect capital market 
hypothesis states that since there are barriers for international capital flows and 
information asymmetry, multinational firms offer shareholders international diversification 
opportunities.3 The tax avoidance or low-cost hypotheses imply that foreign expansion 
increase firm value because it provides firm opportunities for tax arbitrage and access to 
cheap labor costs.4 The multinational network hypothesis argues that a branching-tree
1 See Fatemi (1984), Doukas and Travlos (1988), Morck and Yeung (1991), Doukas (1995) for valuation 
effects of international acquisitions and Finnerty, Owers, and Rogers (1986), Lee and Wyatt (1990), 
Crutchley, Guo, and Hansen (1991) for the effects o f international joint ventures on the value of the 
firm.
2 See Caves (1971), Hymer (1976), Morck and Yeung (1991), Lang and Ofek (1995).
3 See Agmon and Lessard (1977), Froot and Stein (1989).
4 See Scholes and Wolfson (1990), Doukas (1995).
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expansion that takes an expanding firm into a new geographic market leads to increases 
in shareholder wealth [Kogut (1983)]. All these theories imply that foreign direct 
investments are likely to increase shareholder wealth.
Doukas and Travlos (1988) document that firms initially not operating in a target 
firm’s country earn significant positive abnormal returns, while firms already operating 
in a target firm’s country realize insignificant negative abnormal returns, which appear 
to be consistent with the multinational network hypothesis.5 Consistent with the 
internalization hypothesis, Morck and Yeung (1991) find, in a cross-section study, that 
the value of the firm is positively related to its multinationality, and its relationship is 
explained by intangible firm-specific assets proxied by R&D and advertising spending.6
The valuation effects of foreign expansion through international joint-ventures have 
been examined. Chen, Hu, and Shieh (1991) show that U.S. firms experience positive 
abnormal returns for U.S.-China joint ventures. They attribute the positive wealth gains 
to expansion of firm’s global network into a new geographic market. Crutchley, Guo, and 
Hansen (1991) also report that announcements of U.S.-Japan joint ventures are associated 
with positive abnormal returns which is explained by relative currency rate changes 
between two countries, which support Froot and Stein’s (1989) model.7
In a study of U.S. foreign investments in Eastern Europe, Lang and Ofek (1995)
3 The multinational network hypothesis suggests that multinational firms benefit from establishing a
globally maximizing network, which allow firms to arbitrage institutional restriction, capture
information externalities, and improve production efficiency.
6 The multinationality is measured by number o f subsidiary and number of country firms invest.
7 Crutchley, Guo, and Hansen (1991) study shows that shareholder gains is high for U.S. partners when 
the Yen/$ is low.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
71
document that firm’s growth opportunities and low labor costs are positively related to 
the gains from foreign expansion. Recently, Doukas (1995) reports that the abnormal 
returns for foreign acquisitions are higher for firms with profitable investment 
opportunities than firms with poor investment opportunities.8
Although previous studies [Chen, Hu, and Shieh (1991), Morck and Yeung (1991), 
Crutchley, Guo, and Hansen (1991), Lang and Ofek (1995)] have reported wealth gains 
from international expansion, Finnerty, Owers, and Rogers (1986), Lee and Wyatt (1990) 
report negative abnormal returns for international joint-ventures, implying that foreign 
expansion may not be a value-increasing transaction. This latter evidence is not consistent 
with market value maximization hypothesis.
A possible explanation is that foreign investments may be driven by managers’ self- 
interests at the expense of shareholder wealth. Jensen (1986) suggests that managers with 
free cash flows have a tendency to undertake negative NPV investments instead of 
distributing them to shareholders. In this context, foreign direct investment may be one 
way in which managers spend cash flows for their own benefit. The overinvestment 
hypothesis [Jensen (1986)] implies that firms with poor investment opportunities are likely 
to waste cash flows by engaging in negative NPV foreign projects, resulting in 
overinvestment and, thus, a reduction in firm value. On the other hand, firms with 
profitable investment opportunities are likely to use cash flows in positive NPV foreign 
investments, resulting in an increase in firm value. Accordingly, the valuation effects of 
foreign investment decisions may depend on firm’s investment opportunities.
8 Lang, Stulz, and Walkling find similar results in the case o f  domestic acquisitions.
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Another possible explanation is that the valuation effects of foreign investments may 
depend on the type of investment (i.e., focus-increasing and diversifying). Jensen (1986) 
implies that corporate diversification may be the outcome of investment decisions in 
which managers waste cash flows for personal satisfaction. Although in the context of 
domestic investments, the empirical evidence is in favor of an increase in corporate focus, 
Morck, Shliefer, and Vishny (1990) document that, in the 1980s, unrelated domestic 
acquisitions are value-decreasing transactions, while related domestic acquisitions are not. 
Markides and Ittner (1994) also report that related foreign acquisitions are positively 
associated with wealth creation. Lang and Stulz (1994) find, in a cross-sectional analysis, 
that Tobin’s q, as proxy for firm value, and the degree of business diversification of firms 
are negatively related throughout the late 1970s and 1980s. Their evidence suggests that 
focus-increasing firms are valued more than diversifying firms. John and Ofek (1995) 
show that firms that sell their domestic assets to increase corporate focus tend to improve 
their performance after asset-sales.
This study provides direct evidence on the valuation effects of foreign investments, 
using a sample of foreign plant announcements by U.S. firms during the period of 1980- 
1992. In this paper, two alternative explanations for valuation effects of foreign 
investments are discussed: (1) the overinvestment hypothesis and (2) the type of 
investment (i.e., focus-increasing and diversifying).
First, to explore whether the valuation effects of foreign direct investments are 
associated with firm’s investment opportunities, the sample is classified into value- 
maximizing and overinvesting firms, using Tobin’s q, as proxy for firm’s investment
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opportunities. The overinvestment hypothesis predicts that, for value-maximizing firms, 
managers are likely to undertake value-increasing investments. Thus, foreign investments 
by value-maximizing firms are expected to earn positive abnormal returns. On the other 
hand, for overinvesting firms, managers are likely to waste cash flows by engaging in 
negative NPV projects. Hence, foreign investments by overinvesting firms are expected 
to exhibit negative abnormal returns.
The overinvestment hypothesis also implies that, since investments by overinvesting 
firms are likely to be sub-optimal or negative NPV projects, the stock market returns are 
likely to be negatively related to free cash flows. That is, agency costs associated with 
the distribution o f free cash flows are expected to be greater for overinvesting firms. On 
the other hand, since investments by value-maximizing firms are expected to be positive 
NPV projects, the stock price reactions are not likely to be related to the firm’s level of 
free cash flows. Accordingly, stock market returns and the level of free cash flows are 
expected to be negatively related for overinvesting firms and unrelated for value- 
maximizing firms. This study provides cross-sectional evidence on the relation between 
the firm’s level of free cash flows and its stock market returns.
Second, to test whether the valuation effects of foreign investments depend on the 
type of investment, the sample is divided into focus-increasing and diversifying 
investments. If diversifying investments are one way in which managers waste cash flows 
for their own benefit at the expense of shareholders’ wealth [Jensen (1986)], or if an 
increase in corporate focus enhances managerial efficiency, it is expected that focus- 
increasing investments realize positive abnormal returns, whereas diversifying investments
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experience negative abnormal returns. Furthermore, whether the abnormal returns 
associated with the type of investment depend on firm’s investment opportunities is 
analyzed. This study also presents comparison of pre- and post-performance between 
focus-increasing and diversifying investments.
In general, like in Essay I, the results appear to be consistent with the predictions of 
the overinvestment hypothesis. Value-maximizing firms earn significant positive abnormal 
returns for foreign plant investments, while overinvesting firms realize significant negative 
abnormal returns. Furthermore, the relation between stock market returns and the level 
of free cash flows is significantly negative for overinvesting firms and unrelated for 
value-maximizing firms. The evidence regarding the type of investment shows that focus- 
increasing investments gain positive abnormal returns, while diversifying investments 
experience significant negative abnormal returns. This evidence suggests that an increase 
in corporate focus is consistent with shareholder wealth maximization [John and Ofek 
(1995)]. In addition, firms that undertake focus-increasing investments improve their 
performance after foreign investments, while firms that engage in diversifying investments 
do not.
The valuation effects between domestic and foreign investments are also compared. 
The results show no significant differences in abnormal returns between the two samples. 
This evidence implies that the valuation effects of corporate investments seem to depend 
on firm’s investment opportunities and the type of investment rather than the location of 
the investment.
The paper is organized as follows: section II discusses the foreign investment
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decision. Relevant literature is reviewed in section HI. Section IV presents the valuation 
effects of corporate foreign investment decisions. Section V describes the data and 
methodology. Empirical results are presented in section VI. Section VII provides 
concluding remarks.
II. Foreign Plant Investments
U.S. firms have long been investing in wholly-owned plants overseas. The potential 
benefits associated with wholly-owned plants include: (1) protection of parent company’s 
brand name or technology, (2) efficient use of resources by integrating cross-national 
operations, and (3) greater ability of the parent company to control operations. On the 
other hand, the potential costs include: (1) political risks, (2) social and cultural strains, 
(3) problems of repatriating cash flows and assets, (4) difficulties in financing operations 
and expansion, and (5) host country antagonism toward possible divestment.
Foreign plants are important in establishing the competitive position of firms in the 
international markets.9 By manufacturing abroad, firms can enhance their long-term 
business relations outside the U.S. and work closely with customers in order to better 
design customers’ products.10 Firms could also gain access to local, immobile factors of
9 AT&T decides to manufacture residential telephones abroad in order to be price competitive (WSJ Jul.
8, 1985).
10 Motorola will begin to construct a $50 million assembly plant in Japan to produce semiconductors 
for its customers in Asia. Responding to increasing demand from customers in Japan and elsewhere 
in the Far East, the new plant will focus on the assembly o f both high-capacity memory devices, and 
mid-range and high-end microcontroller chips (WSJ Apr. 30, 1990).
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production by locating their high-volume, labor-intensive operations in areas with low 
labor costs11 and reduce transportation costs significantly by locating production facilities 
close to customers.12 In addition, firms could avoid trade restrictions (i.e., tariffs and 
quotas),13 or take advantage of special concessions granted by local governments in 
foreign countries.14 Production abroad in several countries also enables firms to hedge 
against a number of location-specific risks.
Basic methods used to evaluate foreign direct investment can be the same as those 
applied to domestic investment. In both cases, it is necessary to estimate an appropriate 
cost of capital and then, evaluate the expected cash flows from foreign investments. 
However, due to foreign exchange risks, political risks, and government regulations, there 
may be differences in the valuation effects between foreign and domestic investment 
decisions. Foreign investment could be often longer, more costly, and more complex to 
evaluate than domestic investment.15 Accordingly, it is argued that foreign operations
11 Wall Street Journal (Jan. 11, 1984) reports that Ford plans to build a  $500 million plant in Mexico 
reflects a move by auto makers to cut costs by going abroad.
12 Chrysler Corp. plans to move assembly of its Dodge Ramcharger utility vehicles to its truck plant 
in Mexico City this fall from the current production site in Warren, Michigan. Chrysler plans to make 
about 20,000 Ramchargers a year in Mexico and import them to the United States (WSJ Feb. 20, 
1985).
13 The National Semiconductor Corp. plans to invest about $150 million to expand its operation in 
Scotland, intensifying a push into Britain by U.S. and Japanese chip producers. The orders are surging 
in Europe, reflecting demand from computer companies and auto makers. The Common M arket’s 
17.5% tariff on imported semiconductors is also spurring major non-European producers to increase 
manufacturing in the European Community (WSJ Mar. 6, 1984).
14 Motorola agreed to build a $22 million factory in Sri Lanka. The factory will assemble and test 
semiconductor electronic devices. The plant will be built in a free trade zone, where special 
concessions are granted to manufacturers to foster employment (WSJ Oct. 29, 1980).
15 Also see Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) for a discussion o f the valuation effects between domestic 
and cross-border acquisitions.
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must be more profitable than comparable domestic operations [Fatemi (1984)]. To explore 
whether there are any gain differences between foreign and domestic investments, the 
valuation effects between foreign and domestic plant investments are compared.
III. L iterature Review
A. The Foreign Investm ent Decision
Doukas and Travlos (1988) find that the valuation effects of international acquisitions 
depend on the degree of foreign exposure of U.S. bidding firms in the target firm’s 
country. The evidence shows that firms not operating in a target firm’s country, earn 
significant positive stock market returns from foreign investing through acquisitions. They 
attribute the positive stock market returns to firm’s multinational network structure and 
its ability to exploit international distortions in capital markets or production. In constrast, 
firms already operating in a target firm’s country experience insignificant negative 
abnormal returns upon foreign expansion. Although they attribute the negative stock 
reaction to no change in the firm’s multinational network, this might be also explained 
by its overinvestment behavior.
Morck and Yeung (1991) report evidence supporting the internalization hypothesis 
in the sense that foreign investment gains are attributed to the firm’s intangible assets 
rather than its multinationality per se.16 However, their study does not provide evidence
16 Intangible assets (i.e. management skills, patent, marketing expertise, R&D, and advertising 
expenditures) are proxy for growth opportunities.
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on the market response to foreign expansion announcements by U.S. firms. Later, Morck 
and Yeung (1992), in an event study using a sample o f 322 foreign acquisitions by U.S. 
firms between 1978 and 1988, document that foreign acquisitions appear to increase the 
value of the firm only for firms possessing intangible assets (i.e., firms with growth 
opportunities).
The effects of international joint ventures on the value of the firm are mixed. In a 
sample of 118 international joint ventures over the period of 1976-1979, Finnerty, Owers, 
and Rogers (1986) find insignificant negative stock market returns for international joint 
ventures. Lee and Wyatt (1990) also report, in a sample of 211 international joint ventures 
over 1974-1986, that international joint ventures are, on average, associated with 
significantly negative stock price reactions.17 However, these negative stock market 
returns [Finnerty, Owers, and Rogers (1986), Lee and Wyatt (1991)] may driven by the 
fact that their samples consist of firms with poor investment opportunities.
In contrast, Lummar and McConnell (1990) document that U.S. partners of 
international joint ventures earn positive abnormal announcement returns, suggesting that 
joint-ventures are value-increasing activities. Chen, Hu, and Shieh (1991) examine the 
valuation effects of U.S. international joint ventures with a single country - China. They 
show that U.S. firms gain significant positive abnormal returns of 0.52%. Crutchley, Guo, 
and Hansen (1991) also show that, in a sample of 146 joint ventures between Japanese 
and U.S. firms over the 1979-1987 period, U.S. shareholders gain positive abnormal 
returns. However, their study reports weekly abnormal returns. This approach could not
17 Lee and W yatt (1990) suggest that Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis might explain negative 
abnormal returns for international joint ventures. However, they do not provide empirical test.
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identify the market reaction to foreign expansion announcements. The results reported in 
Chen, Hu, and Shieh (1991) and Crutchley, Guo, and Hansen (1991) are limited in that 
their investigations are country-specific. Also, the positive stock market returns may be 
attributed to the fact that their samples include firms with profitable investment 
opportunities.
Lang and Ofek (1995) document that stock markets react positively to U.S. firms’ 
investment announcements in Eastern Europe.18 Their cross-sectional analysis shows that 
gains from foreign investments depend on the magnitude of U.S. firm’s intangible assets 
and low labor cost in the host country. However, since 74% of their sample include joint- 
ventures, their results may be driven by characteristics associated with joint-ventures. 
Thus, it is difficult to draw parallel conclusions on the valuation effects of foreign direct 
investments.
Doukas (1995), in a sample of 463 international acquisitions over the 1975-1989 
period, reports that firms with high q (i.e., q > 1) realize significant positive returns, 
whereas firms with low q (i.e., q < 1) exhibit insignificant negative abnormal returns. This 
evidence indicates that Tobin’s q, proxy for management performance, explains the 
differential gains associated with foreign acquisitions.
Although the empirical works on corporate international expansion [Doukas and 
Travlos (1988), Chen, Hu, and Shieh (1991), Morck and Yeung (1991)] have attributed 
the wealth gains from foreign investments to several factors, no study with the exception 
of Doukas (1995), has been able to investigate the foreign investment decisions from an
18 In the sample of sixty-one foreign investments in Eastern Europe, there are forty-seven joint ventures, 
seven acquisitions, and nine company-owned start-ups.
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agency theoretic perspective. This paper attempts to explain the valuation effects of 
foreign plant investments in the context of Jensen’s (1986) overinvestment hypothesis.
B. Types of Investment Decisions
Although Hisey and Caves (1985) have addressed the issue of what explains the 
choice between related and unrelated foreign investments, little evidence on the effects 
of the type of investment on the value of the firm has been provided. Doukas and Travlos
(1988) report that the stock market returns for foreign acquisitions are insignificant with 
regards to the type of acquisition undertaken (i.e, related and unrelated). In their study, 
the gains from foreign acquisitions appear to be driven mainly by geographical 
diversification rather than product diversification.
In a sample of 159 foreign acquisitions in the U.S. during the period of 1970-1987, 
Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) find that the relatedness of business units of target and 
bidder are not significantly related to the stock market returns for U.S. targets. However, 
their classification is based on product description given in the Wall Street Journal 
announcements of the cross-border takeovers.19
Black and Rose (1991) examine a sample of 132 U.S. industrial firms over the period 
1980-1986. They conclude that Tobin’s q is not significantly related to firm’s degree of 
diversification, measured by the Herfindahl index. As discussed in Morck and Yeung
(1992), this approach does not allow any inference of causality between the type of
19 Dummy variable takes on the value of one if foreign buyer already has operations in the target’s line 
o f business, and otherwise zero.
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investment and its valuation effects. Thus, an event study could be appropriate for testing 
the causal linkage between the type of investment and stock market returns [Lang and 
Ofek (1995)].
Pettway, Sicherman, and Spiess (1993), in a sample of fifty-three Japanese 
acquisitions of U.S. firms between 1981 and 1991, also document that the wealth gains 
of Japanese firms are not significantly related to the type of investment (i.e., related and 
unrelated). In their study, since there are no industry SIC codes available for Japanese 
firms, only the industry names are compared. However, this matching process may not 
be precise.
Markides and Ittner (1994) provide evidence in favor of an increase in corporate 
focus in context of U.S. foreign acquisitions. Their cross-sectional analysis shows that the 
industry relatedness variable is positively related to the two-day abnormal returns, 
implying that related foreign investments are associated with higher benefits than 
unrelated investments.
In previous studies regarding the valuation effects of the type of investment, 
classification scheme may have been ambiguous and less precise [Harris and Ravenscraft 
(1991), Pettway, Sicherman, and Spiess (1993)]. Also, the relation between the level of 
Herfindahl index and firm value has been examined [Black and Rose (1991)]. In additon, 
cross-sectional evidence on the relation between stock market returns and the type of 
investment (i.e., related and unrelated) has been provided [Doukas and Travlos (1988), 
Black and Rose (1991), Harris and Ravenscraft (1991), Pettway, Sicherman, and Spiess
(1993), Markides and Ittner (1994)]. Accordingly, previous studies on the effects of the
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type of foreign investment on firm value is inconclusive. Further, there is no direct 
evidence, to our knowledge, on the effects of focus-increasing and diversifying foreign 
plant decisions on the value of the firm.
VI. Valuation Effects of C orporate Investm ent Decisions
A. Overinvestm ent Hypothesis
A traditional investment decision rule states that managers should undertake only 
positive NPV projects. That is, if the discounted value of expected cash flows from 
foreign investment is positive, the decision to undertake such an investment would 
increase the value of the firm. Thus, announcements of an increase (decrease) in foreign 
investments are expected to have positive (negative) stock market returns.
Agency costs between managers and shareholders are discussed by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). Unless managers are constrained by monitoring or bonding, they would 
make corporate decisions that maximize their own utility. Jensen (1986) argues that there 
are agency costs associated with the distribution of free cash flows. That is, managers 
with high cash flows have a tendency to overinvest by undertaking negative NPV projects 
instead of distributing cash flows to shareholders. Jensen’s (1986) overinvestment 
hypothesis predicts that firms with poor investment opportunities tend to waste cash flows 
by engaging in sub-optimal or negative foreign investments, resulting in overinvestment 
and a reduction of the value of the firm. On the other hand, firms with profitable
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investment opportunities use cash flows in positive NPV foreign projects, resulting in 
shareholder wealth maximization. Thus, the overinvestment hypothesis indicates that the 
valuation effects of foreign investment decisions may depend on firm’s investment 
opportunities.
This paper tests the overinvestment hypothesis by analyzing the effects of foreign 
investment decisions on the value of the firm. Foreign investments may be one way in 
which managers spend cash flows for their own benefit at thQ expense of shareholder 
wealth. Testing for the overinvestment hypothesis requires knowledge of firm’s 
investment opportunities. This paper uses Tobin’s q to distinguish value-maximizing (i.e., 
q > 1) from overinvesting (i.e., q < 1) firms.20 According to the overinvestment 
hypothesis, foreign investment announcements by value-maximizing firms are expected 
to realize into positive abnormal returns, while foreign investment announcements by 
overinvesting firms are expected to produce negative abnormal returns.
The overinvestment hypothesis also suggests that the free cash flows available to 
managers are important in explaining market reaction to the foreign investment 
announcements. Because overinvesting firms are likely to waste cash flows in sub-optimal 
or negative NPV investments, free cash flows might increase agency costs between 
managers and shareholders, implying a negative relation between the level of cash flows 
and stock market returns. On the other hand, because value-maximizing firms are likely 
to spend free cash flows on value-increasing investments, no relation between the level 
of cash flows and stock market returns is expected. To test this implication, this study
20 See Lang and Litzenberger (1989) for the use of Tobin’s q as an indicator o f overinvestment.
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analyzes the cross-sectional relation between stock market returns and cash flows for 
value-maximizing and overinvesting firms, respectively.
Further, to examine the extent of abnormal returns associated with free cash flows and 
firm’s investment opportunities, the sample is divided into four subsamples according to 
firm’s investment opportunities and level of free cash flows: (1) value-maximizing firms 
with high free cash flows, (2) value-maximizing firms with low free cash flows, (3) 
overinvesting firms with high free cash flows, and (4) overinvesting firms with low free 
cash flows. Foreign investment announcements by overinvesting firms with high free cash 
flows are expected to yield the lowest abnormal returns since these firms are likely to 
have the highest agency costs and undertake negative NPV projects. On the other hand, 
value-maximizing firms are expected to earn positive abnormal returns regardless of the 
level of free cash flows since these firms are expected to use cash flows in positive NPV 
investments.
B. Type of Investment Decisions
This section examines whether the type of foreign investment (i.e., focus-increasing 
and diversifying) decision has any differential effects on the value of the firm. Benefits 
and costs associated with diversification strategy are well-known. As discussed in Essay 
I, diversification benefits include: (1) greater operating efficiency,21 (2) less incentive
21 Chandler (1977) argues that, diversified firms are more efficient and profitable than their line of 
business would be separately since diversified firms have better coordination than focused firms.
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to pass up positive NPV projects,22 and (3) greater debt capacity, and lower taxes.21 
Diversification costs include: (1) the use of increased discretionary resources to undertake 
value-decreasing investments, (2) information asymmetry costs between central and 
divisional managers24, (3) cross-subsidies that allow poor segments to drain resources 
from better performing segments, and (4) misalignments of incentives between core and 
non-core business.25 However, the overall valuation effects of foreign diversification 
have not been thoroughly examined.
Some studies have explained the valuation effects of corporate diversification through 
acquisitions in the context of agency theory [Jensen (1986), Morck, Shliefer, and Vishny 
(1989)]. Agency theory states that diversification is undertaken for reasons other than 
market value maximization. Managers’ incentives to invest abroad in unrelated business 
(i.e., relative to the firm’s core business) may be motivated by managers’ objectives such 
as compensation, power, and job satisfaction including reduction of their employment 
risk.26 Jensen (1986) argues that managers with high cash flows are more likely to
22 Weston (1989) states that diversified firms have large internal capital markets so that they make more 
positive NPV investments than focused firms.
23 Lewellen (1971), Majd and Myers (1987) argue that diversified firms are predicted to have more tax 
advantage than focused firms since diversified firms have greater debt capacity.
24 Harris, Kribel, and Raviv (1982) suggest that information asymmetry costs are higher in diversified 
firm than in focused firms, resulting in reduction of the value of the firm than their lines of business 
would be separately.
25 Myer, Milgrom, and Roberts (1992) argue that unprofitable lines of business create greater value 
losses in conglomerates than they would as stand-alone firms.
26 Amihud and Lev (1981) argue that managers have incentive to reduce their employment risk.
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undertake diversifying investments (i.e., in pursuit of a diversification progrrm27) instead 
of distributing cash flows out to shareholders. Hisey and Caves (1985) propose that 
international diversification may occur to reduce managers’ job risk even though 
shareholders could achieve international diversification themselves. Morck, Shliefer, and 
Vishny (1988) suggest that managers often overinvest beyond the value-maximizing level 
and pursue value-decreasing diversifying strategies for their own benefits at the expense 
of shareholders. Shleifer and Vishny (1989) and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) argue 
that managers can entrench themselves by making manager-specific investments, implying 
that diversification is not consistent with shareholder wealth maximization. That is, 
managers may attempt to diversify due to firm’s poor financial performance relative to 
other firms in the same industry. Such diversified investments may make it costly for 
shareholders to replace existing management.
Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) suggest that bidding firm’s experience in the target’s 
industry is an important determinant of gains from cross-border takeovers. Markides and 
Ittner (1994) also argue that related foreign investments are associated with higher 
benefits and lower integration costs than unrelated acquisitions, implying a positive 
relation between the stock market returns and focus-increasing investments.
Balck and Rose (1991) and Lang and Stulz (1994) find a negative relation between 
Tobin’s q and the degree of corporate diversification, suggesting that the capital markets 
value focus-increasing investments more than diversifying investments. It may be because
27 The increase in oil price generated large cash flows in the oil industry in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. However, oil industry managers did not pay out the cash flows to shareholders. Instead, they 
launched diversification programs to invest funds outside the industry (i.e., Montgomery by Mobil, 
Reliance Electric by Exxon). These acquisitions turned out to be unsuccessful.
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focus-increasing firms might have a competitive advantage in core-business, while 
diversifying firms might have not such an advantage. However, in Black and Rose (1991) 
and Lang and Stulz (1994), changes in either the number of business segments or the 
Herfindahl index are estimated to measure the degree of corporate diversification, instead 
of comparing the SIC digit code of new investment with that of firm’s primary business.
This paper provides direct evidence on the valuation effects of focus-increasing and 
diversifying investments, using a sample of foreign plant announcements. The sample is 
classified into focus-increasing and diversifying foreign investments. If diversifying 
foreign investment is one way in which managers waste cash flows for their own benefit 
at the expense of shareholders [Jensen (1986)], Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989)], or 
if an increase in corporate focus enhances managerial efficiency, it is expected that focus- 
increasing foreign investments gain positive stock market returns, while diversifying 
foreign investments exhibit negative abnormal returns.
To examine whether the abnormal returns associated with firm’s type of investment 
differ between value-maximizing and overinvesting firms, the sample is classified into 
four subsamples according to firm’s managerial characteristics and type of investment: 
(1) value-maximizing firms (i.e., q > 1) with focus-increasing investments, (2) value- 
maximizing firms with diversifying investments, (3) overinvesting firms (i.e., q < 1) with 
focus-increasing investments, and (4) overinvesting firms with diversifying investments. 
Focus-increasing investment announcements by value-maximizing firms are expected to 
generate the largest abnormal returns, since these investments are likely to be more value- 
increasing. On the other hand, diversifying investments by overinvesting firms are
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expected to produce the lowest abnormal returns, since these firms are known to engaging 
in value-decreasing transactions and their new investments will signal to the capital 
market that the managers are not in the pursuit of strengthening the firm’s core-business.
Furthermore, Lang and Stulz (1994) argue that firms which have limited growth 
opportunities in their core-business are likely to engage in diversifying investments. 
However, such firms may lack the required competitive edge in non-core business and 
thus should not be expected to benefit from diversification activities. Consistent with Lang 
and Stulz (1994), John and Ofek (1995) report that focus-increasing asset-sales are 
associated with an improvement in firm performance, while diversifying asset-sales are 
not. This study examines the cross-sectional relation between corporate focus and post­
investment performance.
V. Data and Methodology
A. Data
The sample of this essay consists of foreign plant announcements by U.S. firms 
during the period of 1980-1992.28 The sample is collected from the annual edition of the
28 For example,
Baxter International plans to build a $19 million plant in Singapore for the production o f kidney 
dialysis equipment (WSJ Jun.26, 1980).
Analog Device is spending a $44 million to build a wafer-fabrication plant, Limborick, Ireland 
(WSJ Nov. 06, 1984).
Digital Equipment Corp. plans to build a $105 million semiconductor plant near Edinburgh,
Scotland: the plant will supply semiconductors mostly for Digital computers sold in Europe 
(WSJ Aug. 01, 1985).
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Wall Street Journal Index. Once the announcement dates are identified, other relevant 
information is obtained from the articles reported in the Wall Street Journal.
The sample is collected based on the following criteria: (1) firms should be U.S. 
manufacturing companies, (2) firms should be listed on NYSE or AMEX, and (3) CRSP 
and COMPUSTAT tapes are available for the firms. Firms announcing purchase of 
equipment or machinery or capital budgeting, and purchase of plant from other companies 
are excluded. Also, excluded are firms with other corporate announcements around fifteen 
days of foreign plant announcements. This screening procedure produces a sample of 156 
foreign investment announcements.
The sample is divided into value-maximizing and overinvesting firms, using Tobin’s 
q. If a firm has q > 1 (sample size = 42), it is classified as a value-maximizing firm. 
Otherwise, a firm with q < 1 (sample size = 114) is classified as an overinvesting firm. 
The sample is also classified into high and low free cash flow firms. Lehn and Poulsen
(1989) define the free cash flow as operating income before depreciation minus interest 
expenses, taxes, preferred dividends, and common dividends. In this study, the value of 
normalized free cash flows is used as in Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991). Lang, Stulz, 
and Walkling (1991) normalize free cash flows by dividing them by the book value of 
the total assets since large firms are more likely to have higher cash flows. If the free 
cash flows of a firm is larger (smaller) than the sample median, it is classified as high 
(low) free cash flow firm.
The sample is also divided into firms with focus-increasing investments (sample size 
= 105) and diversifying (sample size = 41) investments. An investment is classified as
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focus-increasing if the 2-digit SIC code of the investment is the same as firm’s main 2- 
digit code (i.e., firm’s core business). Otherwise, it is classified as a diversifying 
investment.
Table II-1 shows the frequency distribution of the sample of foreign investment 
announcements by year during the period of 1980-1992. The 156 announcements are 
made by 76 U.S. firms.
[Insert Table II-1 about here]
Table II-2 presents the frequency distribution of foreign investment announcements, 
classified by the 2-digit SIC industrial codes.
[Insert Table II-2 about here]
Most foreign investment announcements occurred in the following industries: 
transportation and equipment, chemicals, electronic equipment, machinery industries, and 
food products. However, foreign investment activity represents a relatively broad spectrum 
of industries.
The frequency distribution of foreign investment announcements by region is reported 
in Table II-3.
[Insert Table II-3 about here]
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Table IM
Frequency Distribution of the Foreign Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms: 
1980-1992.
Year Frequency
1980 18
1981 12
1982 10
1983 7
1984 16
1985 11
1986 10
1987 10
1988 11
1989 8
1990 16
1991 11
1992 16
Total 156
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Table II-2
Frequency Distribution of the Foreign Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms, Classified 
by Industry (2-digit SIC code): 1980-1992
2-Digit
SIC code Industry Group Frequency
20 Food and kindred products 12
21 Tobacco products 2
22 Textile mill products 1
26 Paper and allied products 3
28 Chemicals and allied products 39
29 Petroleum refining 7
30 Rubber and plastic products 5
32 Stone, clay, and glass products 1
33 Primary metals 5
34 Fabricated metal products 1
35 Indust, machinery & computer equip. 17
36 Electronic equipment 20
37 Transportation equipment 33
38 Measuring instr., photography, watches 6
39 Misc. manufacturing industries 1
48 Communication 2
78 Motion pictures 1
156
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Table II-3
Frequency Distribution of the Foreign Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms by 
Region: 1980-1992
Region1 Frquency
South East
Asia 23
China 5
Japan 7
Western
Europe 69
Eastern
Europe 7
Middle
East 1
Canada 23
Mexico 14
South
America 7
Total 156
1 South East Asia: Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Sri Lanka. 
Western Europe: U.K. Ireland, Holland, Belgium, Spain, Germnay, France, Italy, Austria, 
Portugal, Luxemburg.
Middle East: United Arab Emirate
South America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Guyana
Eastern Europe: Poland, Czech, Russia
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Southeast Asia has a sample size of twenty-three. China has a relatively small sample 
size of five. Western European countries appear to be the target countries of U.S. foreign 
investments (sample size = 67). Eastern European countries have a sample size of five. 
Canada and Mexico appear as regions in which U.S. firms prefer to invest (sample size 
= 37). It may be due to geographical proximity.
Table II-4 presents summary statistics of the sample of firms with foreign 
investments, including Tobin’s q, free cash flow, ratio of debt to total assets, ratio of 
R&D to sales, ratio of advertising expenditure to sales, insider ownership (i.e, proportion 
of outstanding shares held by insiders), ratio of foreign sales to total sales, size of 
investment, and firm size.29
[Insert Table II-4 about here]
Panel A shows summary statistics for the entire sample. Panel B provides the 
summary statistics for the sample of value-maximizing firms (i.e., q > 1) and Panel C 
reports summary statistics for overinvesting firms (i.e., q < 1). It is evident that value- 
maximizing firms have higher mean R&D to sales ratio than overinvesting firms, 
suggesting that value-maximizing firms have more growth opportunities than 
overinvesting firms. Insiders appear to control a smaller fraction of shares in value- 
maximizing firms than in overinvesting firms, implying that value-maximizing firms are
29 The data of Tobin’s q and firm size are obtained from COMPUSTAT. The insider ownership (i.e., 
the proportion of shares held by insiders), ratio o f foreign sales/total sales are provided from the 
Value Line Investment Survey. The size of investment is from the Wall Street Journal.
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Table II-4
Summary Statistics for Firms with the Foreign Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms: 1980-1992
N Mean Std. dev Minimum Maximum
Panel A: Entire sample
Tobin’s q 156 0.9105 0.8937 0.0160 5.7660
Free cash flow/total assets' 156 0.1357 0.0567 -0.0064 0.3378
Total debt/total assets 155 0.2154 0.1333 0.0101 0.6232
R&D/sales 142 0.0433 0.0343 0.0035 0.2501
Advertising/sales 92 0.0274 0.0265 0.0057 0.1259
Insider ownership2 129 0.0821 0.1051 0.0500 0.6370
Foreign sales/total sales 141 0.3118 0.1561 0.0000 0.7200
Size of investment ($ million) 109 199.0100 384.8600 3.0000 2400.0000
Firm Size ($ million) 156 11261.2900 14700.7900 126.6700 75346.9600
Panel B: High q firms3
Tobin’s q 42 1.8620 1.2770 1.0000 5.7660
Free cash flow/total assets 42 0.1502 0.0556 0.0534 0.3378
Total debt/total assets 41 0.1886 0.1202 0.0249 0.5762
R&D/sales 34 0.0622 0.0425 0.0056 0.1763
Advertising/sales 35 0.0456 0.0343 0.0090 0.1259
Insider ownership 34 0.0504 0.5306 0.0600 0.1800
Foreign sales/total sales 37 0.3821 0.1253 0.1500 0.6400
Size of investment ($ million) 38 142.4700 229.2000 5.0000 1000.0000
Firm Size ($ million) 42 18508.7900 23321.5800 686.2300 75346.9600
Panel C: Low q firms
Tobin’s q 114 0.5599 0.2076 0.0160 0.9580
Free cash flow/total assets 114 0.1304 0.0564 -0.0064 0.3000
Total debt/total assets 114 0.2250 0.1370 0.0101 0.6232
R&D/sales 112 0.0374 0.0291 0.0035 0.2501
Advertising/sales 57 0.0163 0.0098 0.0057 0.0567
Insider ownership 95 0.0935 0.1165 0.0500 0.6370
Foreign sales/total sales 104 0.2868 0.1589 0.0000 0.7200
Size of investment ($ million) 81 218.5100 425.1200 3.0000 2400.0000
Firm Size ($ million) 114 8657.7500 18723.5300 126.6700 34836.5300
1 The free cash (low is defined as in Lehn and Pouisen (1989) (i.e., operating income before depreciation 
minus interest expense, taxes, preferred dividends, and common dividends).
1 It is defined as percent of outstanding shares held by insiders. The data are collected from several issues 
of the Value Line Investment Survey.
1 High (low) q indicates value-maximizing (overinvesting) firms.
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more widely owned than overinvesting firms. In addition, ratios of foreign sales to total 
sales appear to be higher for value-maximizing firms than for overinvesting firms, 
suggesting that value-maximizing firms have more international involvement than 
overinvesting firms. In terms of market capitalization, value-maximizing firms are, on 
average, larger than overinvesting firms.
B. Methodology
1. Estimation of Tobin’s q
Tobin’s q, defined as the ratio of the market value of the firm to the replacement cost 
of its assets, is used to explain cross-sectional differences in investment opportunities and 
management performance.30 For example, Tobin’s q is used as measure of management 
performance across firms [Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989), McConnell and Servaes 
(1990), Servaes (1991), Doukas (1995)], or firm’s investment opportunities [Lang, Stulz, 
and Walkling (1991), Doukas (1995)], firm value [Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988)].
Lang and Litzenberger (1989), among others, use Tobin’s q to distinguish value- 
maximizing from overinvesting firms. They defined Tobin’s q as the marginal return on
30 For example, the relationship between managerial equity ownership and firm value [Morck, Shliefer, 
and Vishny (1988) McConnell and Servaes (1990)], the relationship between managerial performance 
and tender offer gains [Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989)).
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firm’s existing assets plus the marginal return on future investment opportunities.31 It is 
assumed that marginal returns of capital are diminishing, implying that the marginal 
return on existing assets are larger than marginal returns on new investment. According 
to Lang and Liztenberger (1989), for value-maximizing firms, the marginal return on new 
investment is equal to (or larger than) the cost of capital. Under conditions of decreasing 
marginal efficiency of capital, the marginal return on existing assets is also larger than 
the cost of capital. Thus, Tobin’s q is larger than unity. On the other hand, for 
overinvesting firms, the marginal return on existing assets is less than the cost of capital. 
Under conditions of decreasing marginal efficiency of capital, the marginal return on new 
investment is also less than the cost of capital. Thus, Tobin’s q is less than unity.
In this study, Tobin’s q is used to distinguish value-maximizing (i.e., q > 1) from 
overinvesting firms (i.e., q < 1) to test the implications of overinvestment hypothesis. 
Consistent with Jensen’s (1986) overinvestment hypothesis, for value-maximizing firms, 
the marginal return on foreign investments is expected to be positive and thus increase 
the value of the firm. On the other hand, for overinvesting firms, the marginal return on 
foreign investments is expected to be negative and therefore reduce shareholder wealth.
31 Average Tobin’s q = (X /Q /K  + [(I/C)/K] (P - K) T
= average returns on existing assets 
+ average returns on future investment
where
X: expected earnings from existing assets
C: current capital stock
K: cost o f capital
I: future investment
P: average returns for firm
T: time period
P  > K = (X/C) > K : q > 1 value-maximizing 
(X/C) < K  = P < K : q < l  overinvesting
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The procedure used by Lindenberg and Ross (L-R) (1981) to obtain Tobin’s q is very 
complicated in terms of computational effort and data requirements.32 That is, 
replacement costs are complex to estimate.33 The information about replacement costs 
of plant and inventory is available only for large firms over the period of 1974-1984.34 
Chung and Pruitt (1994) developed a simple formula to approximate the Tobin’s q.35 
The advantages of the approximate q are that (1) all data needed to calculate the Tobin’s 
q can be obtained from the COMPUSTAT industrial files and (2) it is simple to calculate 
q values. To show how the approximate q values are related to the values of L-R Tobin’s 
q, Chung and Pruitt (1994) run yearly OLS regressions between q values from both he 
L-R and approximate q formulas for 10 years from 1978 to 1987. The approximate q can 
explain 96.6% of the variability of the Tobin’s q. They show the comparison of 
Lindenberg-Ross’s Tobin’s q with approximate q for 40 randomly selected firms, in which 
the two methods give close value with the deviation less than 18%. The very high degree 
of observed consistency between the L-R and the approximate q formulas, over the 1978-
32 Manufacturing M aster File compiled by the National Bureau of Economic Research has information 
only for manufacturing firms.
33 The replacement costs are calculated by approximating the plant's age and life and then adjusting its 
book value for inflation. The replacement value o f inventory is determined by assuming that the book 
value of inventory equals its market value when firm uses first-in first-out (FIFO) accounting.
34 During the period o f 1974-1984, only firms with net plant and equipment values in excess of $120 
million were required to report replacement costs of plant and inventory to the FASB.
35 Approximate q = (MVE + PS + DEBT)/TA 
where
MVE: product o f a firm’s share price and the number of common stock shares outstanding, given 
by COMPUSTAT (#24 x #25)
PS : liquidating value of the firm’s outstanding preferred stock (#10)
DEBT: short-term (less than 1 year) liabilities net o f short-term assets (#5 - #4)
TA : book value o f the total assets (#6)
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1987 period, strongly suggests that researchers can employ approximate q values with 
considerable confidence. In this paper, the approximate q is used to distinguish value- 
maximizing (i.e., q > 1) from overinvesting (i.e., q < 1) firms.
2. Estimation of Abnormal Returns
To measure the announcement effects of foreign investments (plants), the event study 
methodology [Brown and Warner (1985)] is used. The initial announcement date is 
designated as day 0 in event time and is verified in the Wall Street Journal Index. The 
market model is used to estimate normal or expected common stock returns. In the 
ordinary least squares model, returns on a given security are regressed against the 
concurrent returns of the market. The CRSP equally weighted index is used as a proxy 
for the market portfolio.
The market model is specified as:
Rj. = «i + bj Rm. + eji
where
R j,: the rate of return on security j for event day t 
a j : estimation period intercept of security j 
bj : OLS estimate of security j ’s market model parameters 
Rn,, : the rate of return on the CRSP equally valued index on event day t 
eJt : the error term of security j on event day t
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The potential for bias of the OLS bj, due to nonsynchronous trading and infrequent 
trading, has been recognized [Eades, Hess, and Kim (1983)]. To correct the bias, the 
method developed by Scholes and Williams (1977) is used to estimate the OLS bj.36
The abnormal returns for an announcing firm are the differential between the actual 
returns on its common stock and the contemporaneous expected returns generated by the 
market model. The abnormal returns for common stock of firm j on the day t are obtained 
as follows:
AR.. = Rjt - (3j - bj R J
where
A Rj,: abnormal returns for firm j on event day t 
Rj, : daily return of firm j common stock on day t
Rn,, : daily return on the CRSP equally-weighted index for all common stock on the 
NYSE and the AMEX (used as a proxy of the market portfolio of risky assets) 
on event day t 
aj : estimation period intercept of firm j 
bj : OLS estimate of firm j ’s market model parameters
The estimation period is from t = 120 to t = -30 relative to the first date of 
announcement in the Wall Street Journal Index. Day zero (t = 0) represents the foreign
36 Scholes and Williams (1977) develop a method of estimating parameters using daily returns in case 
of infrequently traded securities.
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plant announcement event day. The abnormal returns are calculated for each day in the 
event period which starts 25 trading days before the plant opening announcement and 
stops 30 trading days after the announcement. Daily abnormal returns are calculated for 
each firm in the sample over the time interval t = - 1 5 t o t  = +15.
For a sample of N firms, a daily average abnormal return for each day t is estimated
by
In the case of no abnormal performance, AR, has an expected value of zero. Analysis 
of statistical significance requires the standardized abnormal returns to reflect statistical 
error in the determination of expected return. To determine whether the average daily 
abnormal return is statistically significantly different from zero, the average standardized 
abnormal return (ASAR,) is calculated.
where
and
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s , t = r s ?  ( i + — +— :JC 3 ' p  N ) ]
1/2
E
j= l
Sj : the residual variance for security j from the market model regression 
N : the number of observations during the estimation period 
R,,,, : the return on the market portfolio for the day t
: the average return of the market portfolio for day i during the estimation period 
: the average return of the market portfolio for the estimation period 
T : number of days in the estimation period
It is assumed that each of the abnormal return terms is normal and independent across 
securities. For each day, the following t-statistic is calculated as:
t=y/N(ASARt )
To examine whether the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR) are significantly 
different from zero, the cumulative abnormal returns for each security i, CARj, are 
calculated by summing average abnormal returns over event time as follows:
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L
CARj, k, ARj t
t - K
where the CARj K L is for the period from t = day K to t = day L. The cumulative average 
abnormal returns over the event time for day K until day L are calculated by
CAAR«.L=iE CARj.k.l
j-1
The average standardized cumulative abnormal returns over the interval from day K 
to day L are obtained as follows:
L
ASCARKi l=Y , ASARKi l
K
The cumulative abnormal returns for several interval windows around the 
announcement day are calculated.
Finally, t-statistics are calculated for CARKL by
t=,/N(ASCARK'L) / , / K - L + l
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VI. Empirical Results
A. Overinvestment Hypothesis Tests
Panel A of Table 11-5 shows the daily abnormal returns for the event period of -5 to 
+5 days around the announcement day (t = 0) for the entire sample of foreign investment 
announcements during the period of 1980-1992.
[Insert Table II-5 about here]
One day before the announcement (day = -1), firms experience significant negative 
abnormal returns of -0.23%. However, at the announcement day, the abnormal returns are 
negative and insignificant at any conventional level. Panel B of Table II-5 presents the 
cumulative average abnormal returns for several window intervals. The results show that 
foreign plant investments exhibit significant negative two-day stock returns of -0.42%, 
implying that foreign investments have an adverse effects on the value of the firm. This 
evidence is consistent with findings reported in Lee and Wyatt (1986) that, at the 
announcement day, firms engaging in international joint ventures experience negative 
abnormal returns of -0.46%. However, these results reported in Table II-5 are in contrast 
with Lang and Ofek’s (1995) findings which show that firms investing in the Eastern 
European countries earn a two-day significant positive abnormal return of 1%. However, 
the results of these two studies are not directly comparable with those reported here since
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Table II-5
A. Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AARs), t-statistics, % of Positive AARs for the Entire Sample of the 
Foreign Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms for the Event Period >5 to +5 Trading Days: 1980-1992 
(Sample size = 156). *•*,**,* denote the significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
Day Average Abnormal t-statistics(p-value) Positive AAR(%)
Returns
-5 0.0009 0.643(0.521) 51.3
-4 0.0011 0.762(0.446) 52.6
-3 0.0018 0.891(0.401) 50.6
-2 0.0009 1.104(0.271) 53.8
-1 •0.0023 -1.749(0.082)’ 44.2
0 -0.0018 -0.798(0.425) 46.2
+1 0.0013 0.655(0.513) 50.0
+2 •0.0009 -0.549(0.583) 50.0
+3 0.0008 0.237(0.812) 45.5
+4 0.0014 0.689(0.491) 45.5
+5 0.0007 0.232(0.816) 55.1
B. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs), t-statistics for the Entire Sample of Foreign Investment 
Announcements by U.S. Firms for Several Window Intervals: 1980-1992. ♦**,**,* denote the significance at 
the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
Trading
Interval
Cumulative Average 
Abnormal Returns, CAAR
t-statistics (p-value)
[-5 to +5] 0.0038 0.623(0.533)
[-5 to +1] 0.0018 0.551(0.582)
[-2 to +1] •0.0020 -0394(0.693)
[-1 to +1J -0.0029 -1.092(0.276)
[-1 to 0 ] •0.0042 -1.810(0.073)*
[ 0 to +1] -0.0005 -0.101(0.919)
Notes: Day 0 is the first announcement date associated with foreign investments by U.S. firms as reported 
in the Wall Street Journal.
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their inferences are primarily drawn from foreign joint venture rather than direct 
investment transactions.
Although the results in Table II-5 appear to be consistent with Jensen’s (1986) 
overinvestment hypothesis, the sample of foreign investments analyzed in this study may 
contain different types of firms with respect to investment opportunities or level of free 
cash flows. Since the overinvestment hypothesis implies that the valuation effects of 
corporate investment decisions depend on firm’s investment opportunities, this issue is 
examined next using Tobin’s q as the measure of firm’s investment opportunities. The 
sample is divided into two subsamples - value-maximizing (i.e., q > 1) and overinvesting 
(i.e., q < 1) firms.37 Value-maximizing firms are expected to be better managed and have 
positive NPV foreign investments, whereas overinvesting firms are likely to have no 
positive NPV foreign investments. Accordingly, investment announcements by value- 
maximizing firms should cause positive market returns, while investment announcements 
by overinvesting firms should produce negative market returns.
Panel A of Table II-6 presents the daily average abnormal returns for value- 
maximizing and overinvesting firms.
[Insert Table II-6 about here]
One day before the foreign investment announcement (t = -1), value-maximizing firms
37 Lee and Wyatt (1991) divide their sample of international joint ventures into three groups according 
to the economic status of the foreign partner’s home country. However, they find negative abnormal 
returns for all these three groups.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 07
Table II-6
A. Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AARS), % of Positive AARs for the Foreign Investment Announcements 
by U.S. Firms with q > 1 and q < 1, t-statistics for the Daily Mean Differences of AARs Between Two 
Samples for the Event Period -5 to +5 Trading Days: 1980-1992.(t-stastistics are in parentheses) •**,**,* 
denote the significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
Average Abnormal Returns, AAR,(%) Positive AAR(%)
Tobin’s q
Day q >  1 q < i q > 1 q < i t-difference
(N=42) (N=114) AAR^, - AAR^j
-5 -0.0007(0.133) 0.0016( 0.672) 47.6 533 •0.668
-4 0.0020(0.897) 0.0007( 0347) 50.0 52.6 0.480
-3 0.0042(0.977) 0.0010( 0391) 593 48.2 0.742
-2 0.0003(0.047) 0.0012( 1.262) 52.4 55.2 -0.258
-1 0.0069(2.287)“ -0.0058(-3.436)’“ 69.0 35.1 3.63 r "
0 0.0059(2.744)’“ -0.0©49(-2.599)’“ 593 41.2 2.737*"
+1 0.0009(0.073) 0.0015( 0.722) 54.8 49.1 -0.147
+2 0.0029(0.972) -0.002K-1.234) 52.4 50.0 1.447
+3 0.0030(0.721) O.OOOK-O.159) 47.6 45.6 0.841
+4 0.0012(0.275)’ 0.0013( 0.972) 45.2 44.7 -0.016
+5 0.0016(0.518) 0.0004(-0.043) 52.4 56.1 0318
B. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) for the Foregin Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms 
with q > 1 and q < 1, t-statistics for the Mean Difference of CAARs Between Two Samples for Several 
Window Intervals: 1980-1992. *•*,**,* denote the significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns, CAAR (%)
Tobin’s q t-Difference
Trading q > i q < i CAAR,,, - CAAR,,,
Interval (N=42) (N=114)
[-5 to +5] 0.0284(2.793)“ -0.0049(-0.935) 3301"’
[-5 to +1] 0.0196(2.707)" -0.0045(-0.998) 2.914’“
[-2 to +1] 0.0140(2.576)" -0.0078(-2.025)“ 3.247’”
[-1 to +1] 0.0138(2.947)’“ -0.0091(-3.067)” ’ 3.935’"
[-1 to 0] 0.0128(3358)"’ -0.0106(-4.267)’“ 4348’”
[ 0 to +1] 0.0068(1.992)“ -0.0033(*1327) 2.035"
Notes: (1) Day 0 is the first announcement date associated with foreign investments as reported in the Wall 
Street Journal.
(2) If the value of Tobin’s q is greater (less) than 1, the firms is classified into value-maximizing 
(overinvesting) firm.
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(i.e., q > 1) gain significant positive abnormal returns of 0.69% (t-statistic = 2.287). At 
the announcement day (t = 0), there are also significant positive abnormal returns of 
0.59% (t-statistic = 2.744). On the other hand, at day -1, overinvesting firms (i.e., q < 1) 
realize significant negative abnormal returns of -0.58% (t-statistic = -3.436). At the 
announcement day, significant negative abnormal returns of -0.49% (t-statistic = -2.599) 
are observed as well. The mean differences between value-maximizing and overinvesting 
firms are significant at the 1% level for both day -1 and day 0. Panel B provides the 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CARs) for foreign investments for several interval 
of windows. The results show that value-maximizing firms earn significant positive two- 
day abnormal returns of 1.28% (t-statistic = 3.558), whereas overinvesting firms realize 
significant negative returns of -1.06% (t-statistic = -4.267). The difference between the 
two samples are significant at the 1% level.
These results imply that the capital markets expect more value to be created when 
firms with profitable investment opportunities announce foreign investments. On the other 
hand, foreign investment announcements by overinvesting firms cause negative valuation 
effects because these firms are more perceived to waste cash flows by engaging in sub- 
optimal or negative NPV investments. This is consistent with the predictions of the 
overinvestment hypothesis. This evidence also appears to be consistent with the results 
reported in Doukas (1995) where he shows that U.S. acquiring firms with high q values 
(i.e., q > 1) gain significant positive two-day abnormal returns of 0.41% from foreign 
acqusitions, while U.S. acquiring firms with low q values (i.e., q < 1) experience 
insignificant negative returns of -0.18%.
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Jensen’s (1986) argument implies that stock market returns associated with firm’s 
investment opportunities depend on the agency costs over the firm’s discretion of free 
cash flows. That is, since value-maximizing firms are likely to use cash flows in value- 
increasing investments, no significant relation between the level of cash flows and 
investment-related abnormal returns is expected. On the other hand, since overinvesting 
firms are more likely to waste cash flows by engaging in sub-optimal or negative NPV 
investments, the level of free cash flows may have an adverse impact on the value of the 
firm. Thus, the overinvestment hypothesis implies that, cross-sectionally, the abnormal 
returns for investments must be negatively related to the cash flows of overinvesting firms 
and r irelated to the cash flows of value-maximizing firms.38
To explore this implication of the overinvestment hypothesis, this study examines the 
cross-sectional relation between the level of free cash flows and the stock market returns 
for both value-maximizing and overinvesting firms, respectively. Panel A of Table II-7 
reports the results from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of the two-day 
cumulative abnormal returns for foreign announcements on level of free cash flows.
[Insert Table II-7 about here]
For value-maximizing firms (i.e, q > 1), as predicted, the relation between the two- 
day abnormal returns and the level of free cash flows is insignificantly positive. For 
overinvesting firms (i.e, q < 1), the two-day abnormal returns are negatively related to the
38 Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991) discuss the empirical implication o f free cash flow hypothesis.
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Table II-7
A. OLS Estimates of Coefficients in Cross-Sectional Regressions of Two-day (-1,0) 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR.I0) for the Foreign Investment Announcements by 
U.S. Firms: 1980-1992 (t-statistics are in parentheses). ****** denote the significance at 
the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
CARj.ijhc),! = ao + a, FCF
CAR,.Ii#)iq<l — a® + a, FCF
Tobin’s q sample size Intercept Free cash flow1 R2 (%)
q > i 42 0.1111 0.1110 4.000
(0.835) (0.134)
q < i 114 -0.0001 -0.0820 3.200
(-0.020) (-1.866)**
B. OLS Estimates of Coefficients in Cross-Sectional Regressions of Two-day (-1,0) 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR., 0) for the Foreign Investment Announcements by 
U.S. Firms: 1980-1992 (t-statistics are in parentheses). *•*,**,* denote the significance at 
the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
CAR.10 = a0 + a, Tobin’s q + a2 FCF
regl reg2 reg3
intercept -0.0099
(-3.020)***
0.0048
(0.812)
0.0007 
( 0.122)
Tobin’s q 0.0061
(2.372)***
0.0069
(2.682)***
Free cash 
flow
-0.0671
(-1.671)*
-0.0830
(-2.086)**
R2 (%) 3.520 1.780 6.190
1 The free cash flow is defined as operating income before depreciation minus interest expenses, 
taxes, preferred dividends, and common dividends, all of which is divided by total assets for the 
Fiscal year before the investments [Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991)].
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level of free cash flows (t-statistic = -1.86). These results indicate that firms with 
profitable investment opportunities use cash flows productively, while firms with poor 
investment opportunities are likely to overinvest free cash flows. This evidence is 
consistent with the predictions of the overinvestment hypothesis and Doukas’s (1995) 
evidence, based on a sample of foreign acquisitions, which reports that bidder returns are 
a decreasing function o f cash flows for low q firms (i.e., q < 1) and unrelated to cash 
flows for high q firms (i.e. q > 1). Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991) report similar results 
for domestic acquisition transactions.
Panel B shows estimates of regressions of the two-day abnormal returns from the 
foreign investment announcements on Tobin’s q and free cash flows for the entire sample. 
The first regression shows Tobin’s q coefficient being positively related to the abnormal 
returns, implying that foreign investments by value-maximizing firms increase the value 
of the firm. In the second regression, the relation between the level of free cash flows and 
abnormal returns is inverse, as expected, and significant. This result implies that, as 
Jensen (1986) argues, the role of free cash flows available to managers is an important 
determinant in explaining the market reaction to foreign investment announcements. The 
negative relationship between abnormal returns and the cash flow variable is retained even 
in the presence of the Tobin’s q variable. This result is reported in the last column of 
Table II-7.
[Insert Table II-8 about here]
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Table II- 8
Two-Day (-1,0) Cumulative Average Abnormal Stock Returns (CAR., 0), by Tobin’s 
q1 and Free Cash Flow2: Foreign Investments by U.S. Firms: 1980-1992. All data 
are obtained from COMPUSTAT (t-statistics are in parentheses). *♦*,**,* denote the 
significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
High FCF Low FCF Mean
Tobin’s q Firms Firms Difference
0.0173 0.0066 0.0107
q > 1 (2.978)’** (1.079) (1.18)
N=24 N=18
-0.0133 -0.008 -0.0053
q < 1 (-1.570)** (-1.440)* (-1.085)
N=57 N=57
Mean 0.0306 0.0146
Difference (4.502)*’* (1.892)**
1 Tobin’s q is calculated using the formula provided by Chung and Pruitt (1994). 
q > 1 (q < 1) indicates value-maximizing (overinvesting) firms.
2 Free Cash Flows are estimated using the definition given by Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and Lang, 
Stulz, and Walkling (1991). Specifically, free cash flows are defined as the operating income 
before depreciation minus interest expenses, taxes, preferred dividends for the fiscal year before 
the announcement divided by the book value of total assets. The sample median (0.1244) of free 
cash flows is used to classify firms into the high and low free cash flow categories.
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Further analysis, reported in Table II-8, shows that value-maximizing firms (i.e., q 
> 1) with high free cash flows appear to gain substantial significant positive abnormal 
returns of 1.73% (t-statistic = 2.869), implying that these firms create more shareholder 
wealth with free cash flows. That is, regardless of the level of free cash flows, capital 
markets respond positively to the foreign investment announcements of value-maximizing 
firms. On the other hand, overinvesting firms (i.e., q < 1) with high free cash flows 
realize the lowest abnormal returns of -1.33% (t-statistic = -1.570). This evidence suggests 
that these firms have the greatest agency costs over the distribution of free cash flows. 
In addition, capital markets seem to respond negatively and vigorously to foreign 
investment announcements of overinvesting firms with high cash flows. Consistent with 
the evidence reported in Essay I, the valuation effects of foreign investments depend on 
firm’s investment opportunities and the agency cost associated with the distribution of 
cash flows.
B. Type of Investment Tests
B l. Comparison of Valuation Effects Between Focus-Increasing and Diversifying
Investments
Essay I provided evidence in favor of the view that increases in corporate focus, 
based on domestic investment decisions, are associated with shareholder wealth 
maximization. This section examines the valuation effects of focus-increasing and
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diversifying foreign investments. An investment is classified as a focus-increasing if the 
2-digit SIC code of the investment is the same as the firm’s main 2-digit business (i.e., 
core business) reported in COMPUSTAT. Otherwise, it is classified as a diversifying 
investment.39
Panel A of Table EI-9 presents the daily average abnormal returns for focus-increasing 
and diversifying investments for the eleven trading days around the foreign investment 
announcements over the period of 1980-1992.
[Insert Table II-9 about here]
At the announcement day, the abnormal returns for both samples appear to be 
insignificant. On the other hand, one day before (day = -1), diversifying investments are 
associated with significant negative returns of -0.94% (t-statistic = 2.452), whereas focus- 
increasing investments are associated with insignificant positive returns. The results also 
show that mean differences between two samples are significant at the 5% level. Panel 
B of Table II-9 reports the cumulative abnormal returns for focus-increasing and 
diversifying investments for several trading intervals. Focus-increasing investments appear 
to earn positive tow-day abnormal returns of 0.10%, while diversifying investments 
experience significant negative abnormal returns of -1.25% (t-statistic = -1.662). The 
mean difference test, for the two-day abnormal returns, between focus-increasing and 
diversifying investments is significant at the 5% level.
39 This measure is used in several papers [Kaplan and Weisbach (1992), John and Ofek (1995)].
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Table I I-9
A. Comparison of Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AARs), % of Positive AARs for the Focus-Increasing and 
Diversifying Foreign Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms, t-statistics for the Daily Mean Differences of 
AARs Between Two Samples for the Event Period -5 to +5 Trading Days: 1980-1992. (t-statistics are in 
parentheses) *•*,**,* denote the significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
Average Abnormal Returns, AAR,(%) 
Day Focus-increasing Diversifying
investments
(N=105)
investments
(N=41)
Positive AAR(%) 
Focus-increasing Diversifying 
investments investments
t-diiTerence 
AAR,„. - AARdl,
-5 0.0011( 0.732) -0.0029(-1.126) 523 43.9 1.2700
-4 0.0009( 0.609) -0.0006(-0.134) 523 46.3 05455
-3 0.0018( 0.484) 0.0023( 0.979) 51.4 51.2 -0.1355
-2 0.0010( 1.194) 0.0006( 0.465) 543 53.6 0.1202
-1 0.0000( 0.171) -0.0094(-3J24)*~ 50.4 26.8 2.7352*
0 0.0010( 0.757) -0.0030(-0.751) 48.5 43.9 1.1532
+1 0.0015( 0.720) 0.0047( 1314) 523 51.2 -0.8030
+2 -0.0009(-0.622) 0.0012( 0377) 50.4 53.6 -0.6730
+3 0.0011( 0306) -0.0002(-0.185) 47.6 43.9 0.4261
+4 0.0010( 0.809) -0.0024(-0.940) 51.4 31.7 0.7206
+5 0.0015( 0.794) -0.0008(-0.482) 54.2 56.0 0.6115
B. Comparison of cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) for the Focus-Increasing and Diversifying 
Foregin Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms, t-statistics for the Mean Difference of CAARs Between Two 
Samples for Several Window Intervals: 1980-1992 (t-statistics are in parentheses) •**,**,* denote the 
significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
Trading Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns, CAAR (%) t-DIfference
Interval Focus-increasing Diversifying CAAR,^, - CAAR,,,,
investments investments
(N=105) (N=41)
[-5 t o +5] 0.0105(1.649)* -0.0106(-1.135) 2.3166"
[-5 to +1] 0.0076(1.637)* -0.0084(-0.974) 2.1679"
[-2 to +1] 0.0037(1.253) -0.0071(-1.148) 1.6041*
[•lto + 1 ] 0.0026(0.754) -0.0034(-1.595)* 1.6901*
[-1 to 0] 0.0010(0.416) -0.0125(-2.882)*** 2.7345"
[ 0 to +1] 0.0025(1.045) 0.0016( 0.397) 0.1840
Notes: (1) Day 0 is the first announcement date associated with foreign investment as reported in the 
Wall Street Journal.
(2) The investment is classified as focus-increasing if the 2-digit SIC code of investment is the 
same as firm’s main 2-digit SIC code (i.e. firm’s core business). Otherwise, diversifying 
investments.
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This evidence appears to support the view that an increase in corporate focus is 
consistent with the market value maximization hypothesis [Comment and Jarrell (1995), 
John and Ofek (1995)], whereas diversifying investments tend to decrease the value of 
the firm. The negative stock reactions associated with diversifying investment 
announcements may be because diversifying investments are one way in which managers 
waste cash flows at the expense of shareholders’ wealth [Jensen (1986)]. Another possible 
explanation is that firms with poor investment opportunities in their core-business seem 
to engage in diversifying foreign investments [Lang and Stulz (1994)].
This result is in contrast with the internalization theory of foreign direct investment 
which implies that foreign direct investments is a positive function of firms’ intangible 
assets. These results suggest that firms engaging in foreign direct investment either for 
the benefits associated with reverse-intemalization or for survival reasons. The relation 
between the two-day abnormal returns and the type of investment for value-maximizing 
and overinvesting firms is examined below. Table 11-10 provides the two-day cumulative 
abnormal returns for foreign investments, classified by Tobin’s q and the type of 
investment.
[Insert Table 11-10 about here]
Panel A of Table 11-10 shows that Focus-increasing investments by value-maximizing 
firms realize the highest two-day abnormal of 1.52% (t-statistic = 3.739), implying that 
focus-increasing investments by firms with profitable investment opportunities create more
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Table 11-10
Comparison of Cumulative Average Abnormal Stock Returns (CARs.)>0, CARs., ,,) for the Foreign 
Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms, Classified by Tobin’s q1 and type of investment (focus- 
increasing vs diversifying),2 Classified by 2-Digit SIC Industry Code: 1980-1992 (t-statistics are in 
parentheses) ***,**,* denote the significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
A. CAR(-l.O)
Focus-increasing Diversifying Mean Difference
0.0152 0.0044 0.0108
q > 1 (3.739)**’ (0.570) (1307)
N=32 N=9
-0.0048 •0.0180 0.0132
q < 1 (-1.926)* (-3.639)*** (2.513)*’
N=73 N=32
Mean
Difference
0.0200
(3384)***
0.0224
(2312)**
B. CAR(-1,+1)
Focus-increasing Diversifying Mean Difference
0.0163 0.0073 0.0090
q > i (3.089)*** (0.616) (0.679)
N=32 N=9
-0.0062 -0.0127 0.0096
q < 1 (-1.100) (-2.184)** (1.413)
N=73 N=32
Mean
Difference
0.0194
(3.084)***
0.0200
(1.499)
1 q > 1 (q < 1) indicates value-maximizing (overinvesting) firms.
J The investment is classified as focus-increasing investment if the 2-digit SIC code of the investment is the same as the 
firm’s main 2-<ligit SIC code (i.e. firm’s core business), otherwise, it is classified as diversifying investment
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shareholder wealth. On the other hand, diversifying investments by overinvesting firms 
experience the lowest two-day abnormal returns of -1.80% (t-statistic = -3.639), 
suggesting that diversifying investments by firms with poor investment opportunities 
substantially decrease the value of the firm. This evidence may also indicate that firms 
with decreasing investment opportunities in their core-business engage in diversifying 
investments for survival reasons. However, capital markets appear to penalize these firms 
for such investments. Panel B provides evidence based on a broader (-1, +1) window 
interval. The findings are consistent with those reported in Panel A.
B2. Pre- and Post-Investment Profitability Performance
In a recent study by John and Ofek (1995), it is reported that firms with focus- 
increasing asset-sales improve performance, while firms with diversifying asset-sales do 
not. Using this sample of foreign investments, this essay investigates the changes in pre- 
and post-performance of firms pursuing focus-increasing and diversifying investments. To 
compare the mean and median change in profitability of firms with focus-increasing and 
firms with diversifying investments around foreign investment announcements, as in Essay 
I, three measures of profitability are used: (1) earnings before interest, taxes, and 
depreciation (EBITD) to sales, (2) EBITD to book value of assets, and (3) EBITD to 
market value of equity. These ratios represent firm’s efficiency in operations [John and 
Ofek (1995)]. To account for industry changes on the firm’s performance, industry- 
adjusted profitability measures are used. The industry-adjusted measures are estimated by
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subtracting from the firm’s change the median changes, over the same period, of all firms 
in COMPUSTAT file with the same 2-digit SIC code.
Table 11-11 presents the changes in pre- and post-investment profitability of firms 
undertaking focus-increasing and diversifying foreign investments.
[Insert Table 11-11 about here]
In the first two columns of Table II-11, the mean and median of operating margins 
for focus-increasing investments around several window intervals are reported. The results 
show that the mean changes in EBITD to sales ratio are 4.80%, 8.81%, and 9.92% from 
year zero to year one, two, and three, respectively. This evidence indicates that firms with 
an increase in focus improve their performance after investment year. On the other hand, 
the third column which reports performance of firms with diversifying investments shows 
that the mean changes in EBITD to sales ratio are -2.37%, -5.29%, and -7.33% from year 
zero to year one, two, and three, respectively. This result suggests that performance for 
firms with diversifying investments appears to be deteriorating. The other two profitability 
measures - changes in EBITD to assets (ROA) and changes in EBITD to market value 
of equity - show similar results.
This evidence is consistent with the findings reported in Essay I for domestic 
investments. These results are also consistent with John Ofek’s (1995) findings, for firms 
with focus-increasing divestitures, which show that the mean changes in EBITD to sales 
ratio are 0.7%, 1.3%, and 2.3% from year zero to year one, two, and three, respectively.
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Table 11-11
Industry-Adjusted Profitability Changes Around the Focus-increasing and Diversifying Foreign Investment 
Announcements by U.S. Firms: 1980-1992. ***, **, • denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level.
Focus-Increasing Diversifying Difference between Samples
Investments Investments
Mean Median1 Mean Median Mean Median
A. Change in operating margin (EBHD/Sales)2
year -2 to -1 0.0180 0.0049 -0.0142 -0.0042 0.0322 0.0051
year -1 to 0 0.0024 0.0000 -0.0020 0.0098 0.0044 -0.0098
year 0 to +1 0.0480 0.0120 -0.0237 -0.0023 0.0717* 0.0143
year 0 to +2 0.0881* 0.0240 -0.0529 -0.0251 0.1410" 0.0943*
year 0 to +3 0.0992* 0.0267 -0.0733* -0.0752* 0.1725" 0.1019*'
B. Change in returns on assets (ROA)3
year -2 to -1 0.0110 0.0107 -0.0247 -0.0081 0.0357 0.0188
year -1 to 0 0.0117 0.0000 -0.0112 -0.0350 0.0229 0.0350
year 0 to +1 0.0192 0.0042 -0.0551 -0.0410 0.0743 0.0452
year 0 to +2 0.0914* 0.0104 -0.0746 •0.0288 0.1660" 0.0392
year 0 to +3 0.0950* 0.0308 -0.0935* -0.0177 0.1885" 0.0485
C. Change in EBITD/market value of euqity4
year -2 to -1 0.0363 0.0184 0.0187 0.0001 0.0309 0.0184
year -1 to 0 0.0313 0.0309 0.0284 0.0258 0.0029 0.0051
year 0 to +1 0.0327 0.0208 -0.0544 •0.0007 0.0871* 0.0215
year 0 to +2 0.1154** 0.0256 -0.0697 -0.0230 0.1851” 0.0486
year 0 to +3 0.1514*’ 0.1112" -0.0817* -0.0206 0.2310*" 0.1318’
1 Median singiflcance tests are based on the Wilcoxon signed rank tes t
2 The difference between the change in operating margin from year to year and the median change in the industry. The 
operating margins is defined as the ratio of EBITD (eamings before interest, taxes, and depreciation) to sales.
2 The difference between the change in return on assets from year to year and the median change in the industry. The 
return on assets is defined as the ratio of EBITD/book value of total assets.
4 The difference between the change in EBITD/market value of equity from year to year and the median change in industry.
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For firms with diversifying divestitures, the mean changes in EBITD to sales ratios are - 
1.7%, 2.9%, and -3.0% from year zero to year one, two, and three, respectively. The 
evidence in Table II-11 supports the view that, when firms attempt to invest outside their 
core-business in an effort to enhance their investment opportunities, their performance is 
not likely to improve as suggested by Lang and Stulz (1994).
B3. The Relation Between Change in Performance and Change in Focus
This section examines the cross-sectional relation between change in performance of 
investing firms and change in corporate focus. As in Essay I, the same three focus 
measures are used. The first focus measure is used to examine whether or not the 
investment is related to the firm’s primary business. If the 2-digit SIC code of the new 
investment is the same as the firm’s main 2-digit business, the investment is classified as 
a focus-increasing investment. Otherwise, it is classified as diversifying investment.40 
The second measure of focus employed is the number of lines of business segments in 
which the firms engage. The increase in the number of business segments indicates that 
firms increase the degree of corporate diversification. The third measure of focus is the 
sales-based Herfindahl index which is calculated as the sum of the squares of each 
segment’s sales as a proportion of total sales. The closer the Herfindahl index is to 1, the 
more concentrated are the firm’s sales within a few of its business segments and, hence, 
the more focused its operations.
40 See Lang and Stulz (1994) and Comment and Jarrell (1995) for detailed description o f focus 
measures.
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Table 11-12 reports the relation between in changes in profitability from year zero to 
year two and the change in corporate focus measures.
[Insert Table 11-12 about here]
The first regression shows that the firm’s profit margin is positively related to the 
focus dummy, implying that focus-increasing investments enhance firm’s profit margin. 
Similar results are obtained when the other two alternative focus measures - number of 
segments and Herfindahl index - are used. The results also indicate that, when the number 
of business segments increases, the performance of the firm deteriorates. Similarly, 
increases in the Herfindahl index tend to improve corporate profitability performance. The 
two other profitability measures (i.e., EBITD to assets and EBITD to market value of 
equity) yield similar results.41 This evidence implies that foreign investments which 
increase firm’s corporate focus tend to improve its performance two years after the 
investment, whereas investments which do not increase the firm’s focus appear to worsen 
its performance. Although in the context of domestic divestitures, John and Ofek (1995) 
provide a positive relation between changes in firm’s profitability and increase in 
corporate focus. This clearly suggests that corporate focus improves corporate 
performance regardless of how is achieved.
41 The post-profitability results for a broader window interval (i.e., from year zero to year three) remain 
essentially similar to those presented in Table 11-12. When indicator variables are used to capture the 
change in the number o f business segments and the Herfindahl index, the results remain unchanged.
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Table IM 2
The Relation Between the Change in Post-Performance of Investing Firms and the Change in Focus around the Foreign Investment 
Announcements by U.S. Firms: 1980-1992. (t-statistics are in parentheses) ***,**,* denote the significance at the 1%. 5%, 10% level.
Dependent variable: Industry-adjusted change In EBITD/iales from year 0 to year 2‘
regl reg2 reg3
inlerccpt -0.1658(-2300)“ 0.1542(2.938)" -0.1098(-1.986)“
focus dummy3 4 0.2129(2.499)"
change in the number of segments’ -0.0404(-3.098)*“
change In the Herfindahl index* 0.2477(2.470)*"
R’ <%) 4.65 7.83 233
Dependent variable: Industry-adjusted change in EBITD/assets from year 0 to year 2’
regl reg2 reg3
intercept -0.2370(-2.423)" 0.2284(1399) -03059<-1.568)
focus dummy 0.2496(2.158)"
change in the number of segments -0.0571(-2.016)"
change In the Herfindahl index 0.4312(2371)"
R‘ (%) 3.51 3.15 434
Dependent variable: Industry-adjusted change In EBITD/market value of equity from year 0 to year 2*
regl reg2 reg3
intercept -0.1 U3(.1.450) 0.1979(1.004) -ai437(-1348)
focus dummy 0.1796(1.978)"
change in the number of segments -0.0496(-2336)"
change in the Herfindahl Index 0.2914(1.974)"
R’ (%) 2.96 3.85 3.05
1 The difference between the change in the investing firm’s EBITD/saies from year 0 to year 2 and the median change in 
the industry.
2 Focus dummy is 1 if the 2-digit SIC code of investment is the same as the firm’s main 2-digit SIC code (i.e. firm’s core 
business), and 0 otherwise.
3 The change in the number of segments from year -1 to 0.
4 Change in the Herfindahl index from years -1 to 0. The Herfindahl index is calculated as the sum of segments’ sales 
squared, divided by total sales squared.
3 The difference between the change in the investing firm’s EBITD/assets from year 0 to year 2 and the median change in 
the industry.
4 The difference between the change in the investing firm’s EBITD/market value of equity from year 0 to year 2 and the 
median change in the industry.
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B4. The Relation Between Two-Day Stock Market Returns and Change in Focus
While Table 11-12 examines the relation between firm’s performance, using 
accounting profitability measures, and the changes in corporate focus, Table 11-13 
analyzes the relation between the two-day abnormal returns and the changes in corporate 
focus. The two-day abnormal returns are used as market’s immediate assessment of the 
firm’s profitability in response to its foreign investment announcements.
[Insert Table 11-13 about here]
The first regression shows that the two-day abnormal returns are positively related to 
the focus dummy, implying that focus-increasing investments produce 1.32% higher 
returns than diversifying investments. In the second regression, the change in the number
of business segments variable is inversely related to the two-day abnormal returns. It
»
implies that focus-increasing investments are value-increasing while diversifying 
investments tend to destroy shareholder value. The third regression reports a positive 
relation between the change in Herfindahl index and the two-day abnormal returns. This 
evidence indicates that the abnormal returns for foreign investments are higher when 
firm’s Herfindahl index increases.42
42 Using dummy variables for change in the number o f business segment and the change in Herfindahl 
index, the relation between two-day abnormal returns and dummy variables for focus measures is 
examined. It yields similar results as Table 11-13.
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Table 11-13
The Relation Between the Investing Firm’s Two-Day Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (CAR.,0) and the Change in Focus around the Foreign Investment 
Announcements by U.S. Firms: 1980-1992. (t-statistics are in parentheses) ***,♦*,* 
denote the significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
Dependent variable: 2-day Cumulative Abnormal Returns
regl reg2 reg3
observation 145 143 142
intercept -0.0120
(-2.948)***
0.0052
(1.068)
-0.0055
(-1.026)
focus dummy1 0.0132
(2.759)***
change in the 
number of segments2
-0.0024
(-1.872)*
change in the 
Herfindahl index3
0.0042
(1.974)**
R2 (%) 4.96 2.42 0.18
1 Focus dum m y is 1 if the 2-digit S IC  code o f investm ent is the sam e as the firm ’s m ain 2-digit 
S IC  code (i.e. f irm ’s core business), and 0 otherwise.
2 T he change in the num ber o f segm ents from  y ea r -1 to 0.
3 C hange in the H erfindahl index from  years -1 to 0. T he H erfindahl index is calculated as the 
sum  o f segm ents’ sales squared , divided by to ta l sales squared .
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C. Comparison of the Valuation Effects Between Domestic and Foreign Investments
Expansion into foreign markets involves a set of risks and costs that firms do not 
incur with domestic expansion, including risks of changes in exchange rates and exchange 
controls and the complications of both foreign taxation and domestic taxation of foreign 
income. To evaluate foreign investments, firms may compare anticipated rates of return 
on a foreign investment with those on a comparable domestic investment. It is argued that 
firms are likely to invest abroad only when the anticipated rate of returns on the foreign 
investments exceed that on domestic investments [Fatemi (1984)].
Panel A of Table 11-14 presents the daily abnormal returns for both samples of 
domestic and foreign investment announcements.
[Insert Table 11-14 about here]
The results show that differences between domestic and foreign investments around 
the announcement day and several broader window intervals are not significant at any 
level of significance with the exception of -5 to + 5 and -5 to +1 trading intervals. These 
results seem to suggest small differences in abnormal returns between domestic and 
foreign investments in favor of the latter. This may be attributed to the fact that low q 
firms represent 73% of the entire sample of firms investing abroad while a smaller 
fraction of firms (68%) investing at home. This evidence is consistent with findings 
reported by Finnerty, Owers, and Rogers (1986) which point out that there is little
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Table 11-14
A. Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AARs), % of Positive AARs for the Entire Samples of Both Domestic 
and Foreign Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms, t-statistics for the Daily Mean Differences of AARs 
Between Two Samples for the Event Period -5 to +5 Trading Days: 1980-1992 (t-statistics are in 
parentheses) ***,**,• denote the significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
Average Abnormal Returns, AAR,(%)
Day Domestic Foreign
(N=194) (N=156)
-5 -0.0025(-2jl3)“ 0.0009( 0.643)
-4 0.0009( 0.453) 0.0011( 0.762)
-3 -0.0003(-0.160) 0.0018 (0.891)
-2 0.0010( 0.755) 0.0010( 1.104)
-1 -0.0037(-2330f -0.0023(-1.749)*
0 -0.0023(-0.868) -0.0020(-0.798)
+i -0.0023(-1377)* 0.0014( 0.655)
+2 -0.0000( 0.277) -0.0007(-0.549)
+3 0.0008( 1.057) 0.0010( 0.237)
44 0.0022( 2.134)“ 0.0013( 0.689)
+5 -0.0020(-1.095) 0.0007( 0.232)
Positive AAR(%)
Domestic Foreign t-difTerence
AARdom - AARfor
43.8 51 J -1.725*
49.5 52.6 -0.049
48.4 50.6 -0.990
49.5 53.8 0.024
37.6 44.2 -0.636
42.8 46.2 •0.148
49.5 50.0 -1.607'
51.5 50.0 0344
48.4 45.5 -0.012
54.1 45.5 0354
44.8 55.1 -1.274
B. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) for the Entire Sample of Both Domestic and Foreign 
Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms, t-statistics for the Mean Difference of CAARs Between Two 
Samples for Several Window Intervals: 1980-1992 (t-statistics are in parentheses) *•*,**,* denote the 
significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
Trading Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns, CAAR (%)
Interval Domestic Foreign
(N=194) (N=156)
t-Difference 
C A A R ^ - CAAR,m
[-5 to +5] -0.0080(-1.050) 0.0038( 0.623) -1.915*'
[-5 to +1] -0.0091(-2.219)'* 0.0018( 0.551) -2.112“
[-2 to +1] -0.0073(-1.920)" -0.0020(-0394) -1.261
[-1 to +1] -0.0083(-2.656)*** -0.0029(-1.092) -1.482
[-1 to 0] -0.0060(-2.273)** -0.0042(-1.810)* -0.565
[ 0 to +1] 0.0046( 1.596) -0.0005(-0.101) -1303
Notes: Day 0 is the first announcement date associated with investments as reported in the Wall Street 
Journal.
i
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difference in abnormal returns between domestic and international joint ventures. One 
possible explanation is that, as Shapiro (1986) suggests, foreign investment may be 
undertaken for reasons of survival rather than for abnormal returns. Saturated domestic 
markets may force firms to expand abroad just to maintain growth rather than to earn 
higher abnormal returns than domestic investments.
To examine whether differences in abnormal returns between domestic and foreign 
investments are due to the overrepresentation of value-maximizing firms in the domestic 
sample, abnormal returns are estimated for value-maximizing and overinvesting firms. 
Panel A of Table 11-15 presents the cumulative abnormal returns for several trading 
intervals for domestic and foreign investments based on the q characteristics of the firms 
in the two samples.
[Insert Table 11-15 about here]
During the trading period of -5 to +5, both domestic and foreign investments realize 
positive abnormal returns. However, the gain differences between the two samples are not 
significant at any level of significance. Panel B of Table 15 provides cumulative abnormal 
returns between domestic and foreign investments by overinvesting firms. Even though 
domestic investments experience more negative abnormal returns than foreign 
investments, the loss differences between the two samples are not significant at any 
conventional level of significance with the exception of -5 to +5 and -5 and +1 trading 
intervals.
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Table IMS
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs), Classified by Tobin’s q, for Both Domestic and Foreign 
Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms, t-statistics for the Mean Difference of CAARs Between Two Samples 
for Several Window Intervals: 1980-1992. (t-statistics are in parentheses) ***,**,* denote the significance at the 
1% ,5% , 10% level.
A. q > 1
Trading Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns, CAAR (%) t-DifTerence
Interval Domestic Foreign CAAR*,. - CAAR,,
(N=61) (N=42)
[-5 to +5] 0.0107(1.482) 0.0284(2.793)" -1.452
[-5 to +11 0.0060(0.692) 0.0196(2.707)" -1.414
[-2 to +1] 0.0086(2.036)’* 0.0140(2.576)" -0.747
[-1 to +1] 0.0059(2.273)" 0.0138(2.947)*" -1.402
[-1 to 0] 0.0083(3.160)"* 0.0128(3.558)*" -0.843
[ 0 to +1] 0.0013(1.109) 0.0068(1.992)" -1.228
B. q < 1
Trading Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns, CAAR (%) t-DifTerence
•iiterval Domestic Foreign CAAR*,, - O
(N=133) (N=114)
[-5 to +5] -0.0166(-2.260)** -0.0049(-0.935) -1.698*
[-5 to +1] -0.0159(-3.130)*“ -0.0045(-0.998) -1.898"
[-2 to +1] -0.0146(-3.677)*“ -0.0078(-2.025)~ -1361
[-1 to +1] -0.0148(-4.719)*~ -0.0091(-3.067)*~ -1324
[-1 to 0] -0.0126(-4.859)*~ -0.0106(-4.267)*" -0.603
[ 0 to +1] -0.0074(-2.663)** -0.0033(-1327) -1.040
Notes: (1) Day 0 is the first announcement date associated with investments as reported in the Wall Street 
Journal.
(2) If the value of Tobin’s q is greater (less) than 1, firm is classified into value-maximizing 
(overinvesting) firm.
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The results seem to suggest that domestic and foreign investments by value- 
maximizing firms enhance shareholder wealth, whereas investments by overinvesting 
firms tend to reduce the value of the firm.43
In addition, the cross-sectional relation between the two-day abnormal returns and the 
location of investments (i.e., domestic and foreign) by value-maximizing and 
overinvesting firms, and the type of investment (i.e, focus-increasing and diversifying) by 
value-maximizing and overinvesting firms is analyzed. In the first regression, the 
foreign/high q dummy variable is equal to one when a foreign investment is made by 
value-maximizing firm, and zero otherwise. Also, the foreign/low q dummy variable is 
equal to one when a foreign investment is made by an overinvesting firm, and zero 
otherwise. The U.S./high q dummy variable is equal to one if an investment is domestic 
investment by a value-maximizing firm, and zero otherwise. In the second regression, the 
foreign/focus dummy is equal to one if a focus-increasing foreign investment is 
undertaken, and zero otherwise. The foreign/div dummy is equal to one if a diversifying 
foreign investment is undertaken, and zero otherwise. The U.S./focus dummy is equal to 
one if a focus-increasing domestic investment is undertaken, and zero otherwise.
Table 11-16 reports the cross-sectional regression results between the two-day 
abnormal returns on Tobin’s q ans the set of dummy variables described earlier for the 
entire samples of domestic and foreign investment announcements.
[Insert Table 11-16 about here]
43 This study also conduct the same tests, using control sample in which firms have both domestic and 
foreign plant announcements. The results are similar to findings reported in Table 11-14.
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Table 11-16
Cross-sectional Regressions of the Two-Day Announcement Period Abnormal 
Returns on the Tobin’s q, Domestic/Foreign Investment, and Focus dummy for the 
Entire Domestic and Foreign Investment Announcements During the Period of 1980- 
1992. (t-statistics are in parentheses) ***,**,* denote the significance at the 1%, 5%, 
10% level.
variables regl
(N=350)
reg2
(N=333)
intercept -0.0125(-6.052)*“ -0.0083(-3.323)”*
foreign/high q dummy1 0.0281( 6.882)*”
foreign/low q dummy -0.0001(-0.045)
U.S/high q dummy 0.0208( 5.646)*”
foreign/focus dummy2 0.0113( 2.892)*”
foreign/div dummy -0.0008(-0.212)
U.SjTocus dummy 0.0049( 1.336)
R2 18.33 3.27
1 foreign/high q  =  1 if firm  has foreign investm ent and  high  q.
0 otherw ise.
foreign/low q = if firm  has foreign investm ent and  low q.
0 otherwise.
U .S ihigh q = 1 if firm  has dom estic investm ent an d  high q.
0 otherw ise.
Thus, in tercept indicates dom estic investment/low q Arm.
2 foreign/focus is 1 if firm  has foreign an d  focus-increasing investm ent.
0 otherw ise.
foreign/div is 1 if firm  has foreign and  diversifying investm en t 
0 otherwise.
U.S^focus is 1 if firm  has domestic and  focus-increasing investm ent 
Thus, in tercept indicates dom estic/diversifying investm en t
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The first regression shows that, the two-day abnormal returns are positively related 
to both foreign/high q and U.S./high q dummy variables at the 1% level. On the other 
hand, the two-day abnormal returns are negatively related to both foreign/low q and 
U.S./low q dummy variables. These results show cleariy that shareholders’ wealth is 
positively related to the firm’s investment opportunities.
The second regression provides results on the relationship between the two-day 
abnormal returns and the focus dummy variables. This relationship appears to be positive 
and consistent with previously reported results which established the importance of focus- 
increasing investments as a necessity for raising the market value of the firm.
D. Valuation Effects of C orporate M ultinationalism
The multinational network hypothesis argues that firms create shareholder wealth by 
entering into a new geographic market rather existing markets. Previous studies regarding 
foreign investments provide evidence that the valuation effects o f foreign expansion 
depend on firm’s international exposure in a target firm’s country [Doukas and Travlos 
(1988), Chen, Hu, and Shieh (1991)].44 In this study, the impact of corporate 
multinationalism on the value of the firm is examined using the sample of foreign plant 
investments.
Panel A of Table 11-17 shows the daily abnormal returns for firms already operating
44 Doukas and Travlos (1988) classified firms into three groups, a) operating in target firm’s country, 
b) not operating in target firm 's country, c) going abroad for the first time. But in this paper, the first 
two (a and b) cases are examined since their third sample size was to small to draw inferences.
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[Insert Table II-17 about here]
At the announcement day (day 0), firms already operating in a target country produce 
significant negative abnormal returns of -0.64% (t-statistic = -3.399), while firms entering 
into new geographic areas earn significant positive returns of 0.59% (t-statistic = 3.051). 
The mean differences between two subsamples are significant at the 1% level, indicating 
that firms investing abroad for the first time benefit the most. In Panel B of Table 11-17, 
firms already having operations in a target country experience significant negative two- 
day abnormal returns of -1.17% (t-statistic = -1.808), while firms with no previous 
operations gain significant positive two-day abnormal returns o f 1.05% (t-statistic = 
1.801). The mean differences between two samples are significant at the 1% level.
The results reported in Table 11-17 appear to be consistent with the predictions of the 
multinational network hypothesis in the sense that firm value increases when its existing 
multinational network expands through foreign investments. On the other hand, foreign 
investments which do not expand the multinational network of the firm fail to raise the 
market value of the firm. This evidence is consistent with Doukas and Travlos’s (1988) 
findings which show that U.S. firms not operating in the target firm’s country gain 
positive abnormal returns of 0.31%, while U.S. firms already operating in the target firm’s 
country produce negative abnormal returns of -0.08% around the foreign acquisition 
announcements.
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Table 11-17
A. Dally Average Abnormal Returns (AARs), % of Positive AARs for the Foreign Investment Announcements 
by U.S. Firms Already Having Plants in the Target Country and U.S. Firms Not Having Plants in the 
Target Country, t-statistics for the Daily Mean Differences of AARs Between Two Samples for the Event 
Period -5 to +5 Trading Days: 1980-1992 (t-statistics are in parentheses) •**,**,* denote the significance 
at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
Average Abnormal Returns, AAR,(%) Positive AAR(%)
Day Presence No Presence Presence No Presence t-dlfferer
(N=98) (N=49) AARpr^ nCT *
-5 0.0022( 1.490) -0.003K-1J9S)’ 57.1 38.7 1.628’
-4 0.0024( 1.436) -0.0007(-0.264) 52.0 55.1 1.170
-3 0.0023( 1.104) 0.0003( 0.491) 51.0 48.9 0.495
-2 0.0013( 0.908) •0.0016( 0.052) 54.0 55.1 0.699
-1 ■0.0054(-3.025)*~ 0.0046( 1.754)’ 36.7 59.1 -2.730’"
0 -0.0064(-3J99) 0.0059( 3.051)’" 36.7 59.1 -3.323’“
+1 0.0026( 1.470)’ -0.0020(-0.992) 53.0 44.8 1.298
+2 -0.0013(-0.818) -0.0005(-0.207) 50.0 48.9 -0.270
+3 -0.0009(-0.465) 0.0037( 0.941) 45.9 44.8. -1.403
+4 0.0015( 0.117) 0.0002(-0.637) 46.9 38.7 0.279
+5 •0.003K 0.136) -0.0026(-l.186) 57.1 48.7 1.639
B. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) for the Foreign Investment Announcements by U.S. 
Firms Already Having Plants and Firms Not Having Plants in the Target Country, t-statistics for the Mean 
Difference of CAARs Between Two Samples for Several Window Intervals: 1980-1992 (t-statistics are in 
parentheses) *•*,**,* denote the significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
Trading Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns, CAAR (%) t-Difference
Interval Presence No Presence CAARppj,, - CAARpp
(N=98) (N=49)
[-5 to +5] 0.0015( 0.451) 0.0042(0.067) -0.267
[-5 to +1] -0.0009(-0.074) 0.0034(0.357) -0.530
[-2 to +1] -0.0079(-0.800) 0.0069(0.995) -2.416*"
[-1 to +1] -0.0091(-1.122) 0.0085(1.133) -3.098’"
[-1 to 0] -0.0117(-1.808)” 0.0105(1.801)" -4.420’"
[ 0 to -4-1] -0.003K-0.538) 0.0039(0.819) -1.519
Notes: (1) Day 0 is the first announcement date associated with foreign investment as reported in the Wall 
Street Journal.
(2) The presence of plants in the target firms was referred to the Directory of Multinationals and the 
Moody’s Industrial Manual. The 9 observations ir excluded since they are ambiguous to determine 
the foreign exposure.
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E. Cross-Sectional Analysis
Finally, Table 11-18 presents cross-sectional regression results of the two-day 
abnormal returns on a set of variables accounting for other potential factors such as the 
firm’s characteristics, size of investment, and taxes among others.
[Insert Table 11-18 about here]
The first regression shows the relation between the two-day abnormal returns and a 
set of dummy variables for the type of investment and the firm’s investment opportunities. 
Value-maximizing firms (i.e., high q) with focus-increasing investments realize significant 
positive abnormal returns (t-statistic = 3.998), while overinvesting firms (i.e., low q) 
engaging in diversifying investments experience significant negative abnormal returns (t- 
statistic = -2.576). This evidence shows that focus-increasing investments tend to increase 
shareholder wealth, while diversifying investments do not.
In the second regression, the negative relation between the level of free cash flows 
and the two-day abnormal stock returns indicates that agency costs between managers and 
shareholders increase as free cash flows rise, supporting the prediction of the 
overinvestment hypothesis.
The impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on the value of the firm is also examined 
in the third regression. The change in interest allocation rules introduced by the Tax
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Table 11-18
Cross-sectional Regressions of the Two-day Announcement Period Abnormal 
Returns (CAR.,4) on the Firm and Investment Characteristics for Foreign 
Investments by U.S. Firms: 1980-1992. (t-statistics are in parentheses) ♦**,**,* 
denote the significance at 1%, 5 % ,  10% level.
variable reg I 
(N=147)
reg 2 
(N=156)
reg 3 
(N=156)
reg4
(N=83)
intercept -0.0017
(-0.329)
0.0048
(0.812)
-0.0048
(-1.520)
-0.0032
(-0.161)
high q/focus1 0.0247
(3.998)” *
0.0291
(2.966)*”
high q/div1 0.0046
(0.509)
0.0036
(0.340)
low q/div3 •0.0009
(-2.576)*”
-0.0034"
(-1.945)
free cash 
flow
•0.0671
(-1.671)*
-0.0607
(-0.925)
Tax4 • 0.0271(0.763)
-0.0014
(-0.239)
size of 
investment
0.0000
(0.007)
log(asset) 0.0029
(0.640)
debt/assets 0.0025
(0.104)
ownership’ 0.0001
(0.323)
foreign sales/ 
total sales
0.0000
(0.059)
log(firm size) -0.0039
(-0.710)
RJ (%) 12.21 1.78 0.03 16.52
1 high q/focus is 1 if a firm is value-maximizing with focus-increasing investments, and 0 
otherwise. ,,
1 high q/div is 1 if value-maximizing with diversifying investment, and 0 otherwise.
3 low q/div is 1 if overinvesting firms with diversifying investments, and 0 otherwise.
4 Tax is 1 if investments are announced after 1986 Tax Reform, and 0 otherwise.
5 It is defined as percent of outstanding shares held by insiders.
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Reform Act of 1986 reduced tax deductibility of the U.S. interest expense.45 
Accordingly, the Tax Reform Act might have increased the firm’s cost of capital and thus 
decrease foreign investment activities. The evidence in the third regression shows that 
changes in the Tax Reform Act in 1986 did not have any influence on the value of the 
firm around the two-day investment announcement period.
The fourth regression examines whether the two-day abnormal returns for corporate 
investments are related to several other firm characteristics. It is argued that, as firm’s 
debt increases, managers are more closely monitored by creditors and have less cash 
flows to undertake sub-optimal or value-decreasing investments [Jensen (1986)]. This 
argument implies a positive relation between the stock market returns and firm’s debt 
ratios. Also, if managers have a large stake in the firms they manage, they are less likely 
to invest in negative NPV projects, predicting a positive relation between the two-day 
abnormal returns and the fractions of shares held by managers [Lewellen, Loderer, and 
Rosenfeld (1985)].46 In addition, there is the argument that, since large firms have more 
resources, larger internal capital markets, and economies of scale, firm size may be 
relevant in explaining the abnormal returns associated with new investments. Hence, the 
coefficient of the firm size variable is expected to be positive. Even though the firm’s 
debt ratio, the fraction of ownership held by managers, and the firm size variables have
45 The U.S. government have sought to limit how much interest expense multinational firms can deduct 
from their U.S. income. It is because U.S. multinational firms can borrow money in one country and 
deploy the funds elsewhere. The loss of tax deductibility o f interest expense might lead multinational 
firms to borrow and invest less, and scale back the scope of their foreign operations.
44 Lewellen, Loderer, and Rosenfeld (1985) show that bidder returns increase with the faction o f bidder 
equity held by managers.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
138
coefficients with predicted signs, none of the coefficients appear to be significant at any 
level.
Furthermore, it is argued that, since firms involved in international business have 
expertise in foreign investments, firm’s prior international exposure is expected to be 
positively related to the stock market returns. Ratio of foreign sales to total sales, used 
as proxy for firm’s international involvement, is shown to be positively but not 
significantly related to the abnormal returns. Chen, Hu, and Shieh (1991) also report an 
insignificant relation between the ratio of foreign sales to total sales and the stock market 
returns for international joint ventures. In addition, the evidence shown in Table 18 
suggests that size of investment and firm size have little explanatory power. Overall, the 
evidence shows that firm with investment opportunities (i.e., value-maximizing) that 
undertake focus-increasing investments experience substantial abnormal returns.
VII. Concluding Remarks
This study examines the effects of corporate investment decisions on the value of the 
firm, using a sample of foreign plant announcements by U.S. firms during the period of 
1980-1992. In this paper, two possible explanations associated with the valuation effects 
of foreign investments are addressed: (1) firm’s investment opportunities and (2) type of 
investment (i.e., focus-increasing and diversifying). In addition, the overinvestment 
hypothesis [Jensen (1986), Doukas (1995)] which implies that the impact of foreign 
investments on the value of the firm depends on the firm’s investment opportunities and
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the agency costs associated with the managerial discretion ol corporate cash flows is 
investigated.
The evidence presented in this study is consistent with the predictions of the 
overinvestment hypothesis. That is, value-maximizing firms realize positive stock returns 
from foreign investment announcements, whereas overinvesting firms suffer losses. 
Furthermore, the relation between the two-day abnormal returns and the level o f free cash 
flows is significantly negative, indicating that agency costs increase with the level of free 
cash flows as predicted by the overinvestment hypothesis.
The evidence on the effects of the type of investment on the value of the firm shows 
that focus-increasing investments increase shareholder wealth, while diversifying 
investments do not. That is, an increase in corporate focus is consistent with shareholder 
wealth maximization [John and Ofek (1995)]. In addition, pre- and post-performance tests 
provide evidence which shows that focus-increasing investments tend to improve 
corporate performance, while diversifying investments do not. This evidence appears to 
support the view [Lang and Stulz (1994)] that diversifying investments are not value- 
increasing. That is, firms might increase shareholder wealth by investing on the business 
in which they may have competitive edge.
Further, comparison between domestic and foreign investments indicates no 
significant differences in abnormal returns between the two samples. This evidence 
indicates that poorly managed firms go abroad for survival reasons [Shapiro (1986)]. This 
study also presents evidence which shows that when firms enter into a new geographic 
market create shareholder wealth, implying that they enhance their ability to arbitrage
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cross-country differences by expanding the firm’s network. Focus-expansion, however, 
appears to yield the highest gain for the shareholders of the expanding firms.
Cross-sectional analysis shows that the firm’s investment opportunities and 
investments that strengthen its corporate focus are yielding the higheest returns. However, 
other control variables such as size of investment, fraction of shares held by managers, 
ratio of foreign sales to total sales, and firm size are found to have little explanatory 
power.
Consistent with the findings reported in Essay I, this study provides evidence which 
shows that well-mananged firms with growth opportunities increase shareholder wealth 
when they undertake focus-increasing foreign investments primarily in geographical 
regions without previous operating exposure.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
141
References
Agmon, T. and D. Lessard, 1977, Investor Recognition of Corporate International 
Diversification, Journal of Finance 32, pp.1049-1055
Amihud, Yakov and Baruch Lev, 1981, Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for 
Conglomerate Mergers, Bell Journal of Economics 12, 605-617.
Berger, Philip G. and Eli Ofek, 1995, Diversification’s Effect on Firm Value, Journal of 
Financial Economics 37, 39-65.
Black, Joseph and Lawrence C. Rose, 1991, Evidence of the Impact of Direct Investment 
Strategies on Firm Value, Journal of Multinational Financial Management 1, 81-104
Brown, Stephen J. and Jerold B. Warner, 1985, Using Daily Stock Returns, The Case of 
Event Studies, Journal of Financial Economics 14, 3-31.
Caves, R.E., 1971, International Corporations: The Industrial Economics of Foreign 
Investment, Economica 38, 1-27.
Chandler, Alfred D., 1977, The Visible Hand, Cambridge, Mass.: Bellknap Press.
Chen, Haiyang, Michael Y. Hu, and Joseph C.P. Shieh, 1991, The Wealth Effects of 
International Joint Ventures: The Case of U.S. Investment in China, Financial 
Management 20, 31-41
Chung, Kee H. and Stephen W. Pruitt, 1994, A Simple Approximation of Tobin’s q, 
Financial Management 23, 70-74.
Comment, R. and G.A. Jarrell, 1995, Corporate Focus and Stock Returns, Journal of 
Financial Economics 37, 67-87.
Crutchley, Claire E., Enyang Guo, and Robert S. Hansen, 1991, Stockholder Benefits 
From Japanese-U.S. Joint Ventures, Financial Management 20, 22-30.
Doukas, John and Nickolaos G. Travlos, 1988, The Effect of Corporate Multinationalism 
on Shareholders’ Wealth: Evidence from International Acquisitions, Journal of 
Finance 43, 1161-1175.
Doukas, John, 1995, Overinvestment, Tobin’s q and Gains from Foreign Acquisitions, 
Journal of Banking and Finance 19, 1285-1303.
Eades, Hess, and E. Kim, 1984, On Interpreting Security Returns During the Ex-Dividend
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
142
Period, Journal of Financial Economics 13, 3-35.
Fatemi, A.M., 1984, Shareholder Benefits from Corporate International Diversification, 
Journal of Finance 34, 1325-1344.
Finnerty J.E., J.E. Owers, and R.C. Rogers, 1986, The Valuation Impact of Joint 
Ventures, Management International Review 2, 14-26.
Froot, K. and J. Stein, 1991, Exchange Rates and Foreign Direct Investment: An
Imperfect Capital Markets Approach, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 
1191-1217.
Gombola, M.J. and G.P. Tsetsekos, 1992, The Information Content of Plant Closings 
Announcements: Evidence from Financial Profiles and the Stock Price Reaction, 
Financial Management 21, 31-40.
Harris, M., C.H. Kribel, and A. Raviv, 1982, Asymmetric Information, Incentives and 
Intrafirm Resources Allocation, Management Science, 604-620.
Harris, Robert S. and David Ravenscraft, 1991, The Role of Acquisitions in Foreign 
Direct Investment: Evidence from the U.S. Stock Market, Journal of Finance 46, 
825-844.
Hisey, Karen and Richard E. Caves, 1985, Diversification Strategy and Choice of 
Country: Diversifying Acquisitions Abroad by U.S. Multinationals, 1978-1980, 
Journal of International Business Studies 15, 51-64
Hymer, S., 1976, The International Operations of National Firms: A Study of Direct 
Foreign Investment (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), Dissertation, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology.
Jensen, M., 1986, Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 
American Economic Review 76, 323-329.
Jensen, M. and William H. Meckling, 1976, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3,305-360.
John, Kose and Eli, Ofek, 1995, Asset Sales and Increase in Focus, Journal of Financial 
Economics 37, 105-126.
Kaplan, Steven N. and Michael S. Weisbach, 1992, The Success of Acquisitions: 
Evidence from Divestitures, Journal of Finance 47, 107-138.
Kogut, B, 1983, Foreign Direct Investment As a Sequential Process, In C. Kindleberger
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
143
and D. Andertsch (eds.), The Multinational Corporations in the 1980s, Cambridge, 
MA, The MIT Press, 38-56.
Lang, H.P. Larry and R. Litzenberger, 1989, Dividend Announcements: Cash Flow
Signalling vs. Free Cash Flow Hypothesis, Journal of Financial Economics 24, 181- 
191.
Lang, H.P. Larry and Rene M. Stulz, and Ralph A. Walkling, 1989, Managerial
Performance, Tobin’s q, and the Gains from Successful Tender Offers, Journal of 
Financial Economics 24, 137-154.
Lang, H.P. Larry and Rene M. Stulz, and Ralph A. Walkling, 1991, A Test of the Free 
Cash Flow Hypothesis: The Case of Bidder Returns, Journal of Financial Economics 
29, 315-335.
Lang, H.P. Larry and Rene M. Stulz, 1994, Tobin’s q, Corporate Diversification, and Firm 
Performance, Journal of Political Economy 102, 1248-1280.
Lang, Larry and Eli, Ofek, Why Do Firms Invest In Eastern Europe?, 1995, European 
Financial Management 1, 147-171.
Lebaron, Dean and Lawrence S. Speidell, 1987, Why Are the Parts Worth More Than the 
Sum? ’Chop Shop’, a Corporate Valuation Model, In Merger Boom edited by Lynn
E. Browne and Eric S. Rosengren. Conference Series, no.31. Boston: Fed. Reserve 
Bank.
Lee, I., S.B. Wyatt, 1990, The Effects of International Joint Ventures on Shareholders 
Wealth, Financial Review, 641-649.
Lehn, Kenneth and Annette Poulsen, 1989, Free Cash Flow and Stockholder Gains in 
Going Private Transactions, Journal of Finance 44, 771-789.
Lewellen, Wilbur, 1971, A Pure Financial Rationales for the Conglomerate Merger, 
Journal of Finance 26, 521-537.
Lewellen, Wibur, Claudio Loderer, and Ahron Rosenfeld, 1985, Merger Decisions and 
Executive Stock Ownership in Acquiring Firms, Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 7, 209-231
Lindenburg, Eric B. and Stephen A. Ross, 1981, Tobin’s q Ratio and Industrial 
Organization, Journal of Business 54, 1-32.
Lummar, S.L. and J.J. McConnell, 1990, Valuation Effects of International Joint Ventures, 
in Pacific Basin Capital Markets Research, edited by Rhee, S.G. and R.P. Chang
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
144
(New York:Elsevier Science Publishers, 531-546.
Majd, S. and S.C. Meyers, 1987, Tax Asymmetries and Corporate Income Tax Reform, 
in: M. Feldstein, ed., Effects of Taxations on Capital Accumulation (University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, IL)
Markides, Constantinos C. and Christopher D. Ittner, 1994, Shareholder Benefits From 
Corporate International Diversification: Evidence From U.S. International 
Acquisitions, Journal of International Business Studies 24 , 343-366
McConnell, J. J. and C. J. Servaes, 1990, Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and 
Corporate Value, Journal of Financial Economics 27, 595-612.
Myer, Michael, Paul Milgrom, and John Roberts, 1992, Organizational Prospects,
Influence Costs, and Ownership Changes, Journal of Economic and Management 
Strategy 1, 9-35.
Morck, Randall, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, 1988, Management Ownership 
and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 
293-315.
Morck, Randall, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, 1989, Alternative Mechanisms 
for Corporate Control, American Economic Review 79, 842-852.
Morck, Randall, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, 1990, Do Managerial Objective 
Drive Bad Acquisition?, Journal of Finance 45, 31-48.
Morck, R. and B. Yeung, 1991, Why Investors Value Multinationality?, Journal of 
Business 64, 165-187.
Morck, R. and B. Yeung, 1992, Internalization: An Event Study Test, Journal of 
International Economics 33, 41-56.
Pettway, Richard H., Neil, W. Sicherman, and D. Katherine Spiess, 1993, Japanese
Foreign Direct Investment: Wealth Effects From Purchases and Sales of U.S. Assets, 
Financial Management, 82-95
Scholes, Myron and J. Williams, 1977, Estimating Betas From Nonsynchronous Data, 
Journal of Financial Economics 5, 309-328.
Scholes, M.S. and M.A. Wolfson, 1990, The Effects of Changes in Tax Laws On 
Corporate Reorganization Activity, Journal of Business 63, 141-164.
Servaes, Henri, 1991, Tobin’s q and the Gains from Takeovers, Journal of Finance 54,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
145
409-419.
Shapiro, A., 1986, Multinational Financial Management, Allyn and Bacon, Boston, MA.
Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishny, 1989, Management Entrenchment: The Case of 
Manager-Specific Investments, Journal of Financial Economics 25, 123-139.
Wall Street Journal, various issues.
Wemerfelt, Birger and Cynthia A. Montgomery, 1988, Tobin’s q and the Importance of 
Focus in Firm Performance, American Economic Review 78, 246-250.
Weston, J. Fred, 1989, Divestitures: Mistakes or Learning, Journal of Applied Corporate 
Finance 2, 68-76.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
VITA
Address:
Kyung Gi Do, Gwacheon Si, Boo Lim Dong, Joo Gong APT. 805-207 
South Korea
Educational Background:
B.A. Political Science, February 1982, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
MBA, May 1990, Washington State University
PH. D., Finance, May 1996, Old Dominion University
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
